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ABSTRACT
In 2016, the Baton Rouge region experienced what would come to be record-setting
precipitation levels. The 1,000 year rainfall event dumped almost triple the amount of water on
Louisiana than was seen during Hurricane Katrina (some areas received over 10 inches of rain in
a matter of hours), with rain persisting from August 12th until the 17th. Previously a part of
Baton Rouge, Central is a relatively new development that expanded into the 100 year floodplain
in 2005. This thesis will present the changing geographies of flood mitigation policies since a
major flood in 1983 to the present, with particular focus on the lead up and immediate aftermath
of catastrophic flooding events that occurred in 2016. Drawing upon interviews and review of
public policies the thesis will show the paradoxes in government planning when it comes to safe
versus economic development, summarize expressions of community opinion and input in flood
planning, and compare them with policy change in recent decades. The results of this
comparative analysis indicate a lack in evolution of government policy to match the speed of
development into flood-prone areas, the recent growth in public expressions about flood safety
and the importance of reconciling safe and economic development interests when implementing
policy, especially at the local level.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: LOUISIANA AND WATER

1.1. Flooding and Development
Floods are among the world’s most destructive and commonplace natural hazards. They
pose major threats to coastal communities and low-lying inland areas throughout the United
States. In order to mitigate the risks, many local and state governments establish policies that
facilitate acquisition of insurance and set construction requirements aimed at making buildings
more flood resistant, but often see varied success rates. Massive efforts to redirect and mitigate
floods have resulted in ambitious engineering efforts, not limited to New Orleans's extensive
levee system and massive dikes and dams in the Netherlands. Such efforts continue as climate
change continues to put pressure on exposed areas around the world.
In addition to understanding the physical exposure to floods, understanding vulnerability
to flood hazards is key to being able to implement lasting solutions. Vulnerability is a term that
can be used to cover many aspects of the human side of the hazard equation. Flood hazards have
a varied impact on people, which are partly influenced by the socio-economic system they live
in. Within a country or region, some communities are more vulnerable than others, and within
some communities, individuals may be more or less sensitive. Those who are most vulnerable to
the flood hazard may be unable to escape the risk or cope with the damages due to limited
resources (money, knowledge, work flexibility, mobility).1 Vulnerability accounts for many of
the different ways that people go about dealing with flood hazard, but it has several components.
Exposure is an area’s location within an area that is prone to flooding.2 It can be understood as

1

David Homes and Croot, David. “Flood Risk and Human Vulnerability” in Special Topics in Geography: Flood
Risk and Management, eds. Bob Digby and Sue Warn (Sheffield, UK: Oxford, 2010), 20-27
2
David Homes and Croot, David. “Flood Risk and Human Vulnerability,” 25.
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the physical geographical characteristics – location in a floodplain or in a mountain valley that
receives ample precipitation. Human elements exposed within the system constitute
susceptibility, such as the people or infrastructure that are most sensitive, which influences the
probabilities of being harmed at times of hazardous floods. It includes the social context of flood
damage, especially the awareness and preparedness of affected people regarding the risk they
live with, the institutions that are involved in mitigating effects of hazards and the existence of
measures to help assist during flood events, like evacuation routes.3 Resilience, or the capacity of
a system to endure and recover from a hazard/disaster event while maintaining significant levels
of organization in its social, economic, environmental, and physical components is vitally
important for recovery from floods.4 This characteristic is evaluated best in places which have
experienced past flood events, since the main metric is recovery.
A critical factor when it comes to the relationship between people and floodplains
development is the paradox found in disaster policy. Raymond Burby introduces the idea of
paradoxes, such as the contrast between policies that seek to foster either safe or economic
development.5 Economic development prioritizes potential gains from increased real estate value
and the associated tax revenue, even at the expense of environmental safety. On the other hand,
safe development allows for floodplain development, but does so in a way that does not put
undue risk on communities and places that are being developed. Burby outlines how local
citizens often bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, while local
officials pay insufficient attention to policies to limit their vulnerability or susceptibility. Burby

3

Ibid. 26
T.J. Wilbanks, “Enhancing the Resilience of Communities to Natural and Other Hazards: What We Know and
What We Can Do.” Natural Hazards Observer 32 (2008): 10-11.
5
Raymond Burby, "Hurricane Katrina and the paradoxes of government disaster policy: Bringing about wise
governmental decisions for hazardous areas." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 604, no. 1 (2006): 171-191.
4
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demonstrates in his article that in spite of the two paradoxes, disaster losses can be blunted if
local governments pay attention to hazard mitigation at the local scale from the outset of the
planning process, implying that community-led efforts are one of the best ways to deal with
hazard planning.
1.2. The Case for Central, Louisiana and Research Questions
Most of southeast Louisiana has modest elevation, a dense stream network, and
ample local precipitation. A large portion of New Orleans, encircled by levees, is below sea
level. Even areas well inland – including highly populated areas – such as the Greater Baton
Rouge area, stand only a few dozen feet above sea level and can expect previously unanticipated
impacts from elevated storm surge due to rising seas and also heavier rainfall events.6 While
residents of coastal regions are often aware of the risk they undertake by settling in these areas,
issues of flooding are also a monumental problem in inland communities. We can look at the
damage caused in Baton Rouge by the floods of 2016 for recent evidence of this. In 2016, the
Baton Rouge region experienced what would come to be record-setting precipitation levels. The
1,000 year rainfall event dumped almost triple the amount of water on Louisiana than was seen
during Hurricane Katrina (some areas received over 10 inches of rain in a matter of hours), with
rain persisting from August 12th until the 17th.7 Looking back on this extreme event, some
questions that remain include how the disaster might have been downgraded to a less serious
flood through effective mitigation efforts since the last major flood in the Amite River basin in
1983. Thirty-three years is ample time for flood mitigation policies and infrastructure to be put in

6

United States Geological Survey (USGS). “Highlighting Low-Lying Areas – State of Louisiana.” (2007). Accessed
on 23 September 2019: http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/sim3049
7
National Weather Service. “August 2016 Flood Summary.” Accessed 10 September 2019:
https://www.weather.gov/lix/August2016flood
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place to better protect communities from future events, yet there were lapses in the public
response which left the region susceptible to a second major rainfall event.
Central lies in a particularly precarious position in the Amite River Basin (Fig.
1.1). The city is immediately upstream of the confluence of the Comite and Amite Rivers, with
the two rivers making up the city’s southern boundary. In addition, most of the city lies in the
100-year floodplain.

Figure 1.1. Study Area. Source: Map by Tanvi Shah, LSU Coastal Sustainability Studio
As a whole, Louisiana has experienced a loss of 309 square miles of wetland from 1996 to
2010.8 This loss of land can exacerbate the effects of abnormally intense rainfall events in
riparian basins that reach the coast. In addition, the high economic productivity in coastal areas
(especially on the Gulf of Mexico) coupled with the rapid loss of protective marshland makes for
8

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “Louisiana Coastal Facts.” (2018). Accessed 3
September 2019: https://coast.noaa.gov/states/louisiana.html
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large-scale problems on the coast, along with more intense storms associated with climate
change that threaten more severe impacts. Loss of the coastal buffer, along with rising sea levels,
will enable more direct impacts from tropical weather on areas now well removed from the
shore. While many may think first of the coast when loss of wetlands is mentioned, it is
important to note that riparian areas that lie further inland will also absorb some of these impacts
of a loss in coastline. Rising seas and an elevation in storm surge will extend the risk inland.

Figure 1.2. Projected Future Inundation from a 100 Year Flood Event with No Intervention
Source: CPRA’s 2017 Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast
The Louisiana Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast showcases how land loss will affect the area
surrounding Lake Maurepas (northeast corner of map, directly west of Lake Pontchartrain),
which is the lower part of the Amite River Basin. In response to continued land loss and
increasing flood risk and to improve the sustainability of the coastal landscape, communities, and
economic future, Louisiana relies on the master planning process to define and implement
projects that proactively address known and anticipated threats from rising seas.9 The graphic
above asserts the level of inundation the area will experience if no steps are taken to address sealevel rise. Baton Rouge can be seen in the extreme upper middle of the map. Despite being 60

9

Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA). Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable
Coast (Baton Rouge, LA: Office of the Governor, 2017) p.ES-9
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plus miles from the Gulf of Mexico, the greater Baton Rouge area and the upper part of the
Amite Basin will undoubtedly also feel the effects of a changing coastline.
Several things have changed in East Baton Rouge Parish since the devastating flood
in 1983, including demographics and land-use practices, but some flood management policies
have, unfortunately, stayed the same. For instance, the community of Central, Louisiana is a
relatively new community that had developed in the 100-year flood plain and incorporated as a
municipality in 2005 (City of Central 2018).10 Central differs from many of the communities
immediately around it demographically and economically in that it is mostly made up of
middle/upper middle class white populations.11 Since the community’s founding in 2005, the
idea of place attachment has not become a major influence in decisions about remaining in flood
zones as in coastal areas but the community is still incredibly tight-knit, as is common in
Louisiana. It can serve as a unique case study of how current policy professionals, local officials,
and city residents view development in the floodplain – 65 percent of Central is in the 100 year
floodplain. This thesis will examine how changing flood mitigation policies affect the response
to high water in the greater Baton Rouge area, focusing on how Central administrators have
chosen to deal with future floods that will inevitably plague the city. In response to Raymond
Burby’s 2006 discussion of disaster policy paradoxes, this thesis will address the following
questions:


Do local and federal government policies inhibit or enable development into the
floodplain?

10

City of Central. “About Central.” (2019) Accessed 10 September 2019: https://www.centralgov.com/about-central
U.S. Census Bureau. “Income, Population and Housing Central, Louisiana.” Quick Facts. Accessed Dec 12, 2019:
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/LA
11
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How have the policies effecting Central addressed safe versus economic development
since the 2016 floods?

1.3. Methodologies
Qualitative methods provide the most appropriate approach to this topic.
Qualitative researchers generally engage in studying real‐world settings inductively to generate
telling narrative descriptions and construct well-informed case studies. Inductive analysis across
cases yields patterns and themes, which are the fruit of qualitative research.12 In the case of this
geographical study it was important to me to not just understand the “what and how” of policy
and institutional evolution and the public reaction, but also the “why.” Weimer and Vining
suggest that the best policy analysis relies on case studies of the areas to be studied to
demonstrate long term effects of proposed policy. They additionally assert that ideas that are
politically feasible at the given moment in time may become so in the future if they are raised
repeatedly enough and supported with sound evidence from case studies.13 With this “why” and
importance of the proposed usefulness of case studies in mind, I rely heavily on interviews and
also employ case studies to thoroughly analyze public policies. I utilized a significant amount of
public data from the three parishes compromising my broader study area – Ascension,
Livingston, and East Baton Rouge, focusing on the town of Central in East Baton Rouge Parish.
I reviewed ordinances and policies that addressed residential and economic development in the
floodplain and classified these policies according to their prioritization of either safe or economic
development. In some cases, policies had pieces that fit both.

12

Patrick Biernacki, and Dan Waldorf. "Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral
Sampling." Sociological Methods & Research 10, no. 2 (1981): 141-163.
13
David Leo Weimer, and Aidan R. Vining. Policy Analysis Concepts and Practice. 6th ed. (New York, NY:
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017).
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Before embarking on the analysis of policies, it was important to outline criteria
that classified policies as either safe or economic. Actions taken by the city can be categorized
as either reflecting economic development interests or safety interests; the table below classifies
policies and actions accordingly (Figure 1.1). These definitions are built upon the ideas first
presented by Raymond Burby in his discussion of government planning paradoxes in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in New Orleans. He classifies the paradoxes as such: (1) in trying to
make hazardous areas safer, the federal government in fact substantially increases the potential
for catastrophic property damages and economic loss and (2) while their citizens bear the brunt
of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, local officials pay insufficient attention to
policies that would more effectively limit vulnerability.14 Safe development practices work to
amend issues that stem from the second paradox, while economic development contends with the
first.
The definitions depended upon for this thesis are more concrete. Safe development
practices are most importantly categorized by engagement with the natural environment and
direct interaction with local residents. Policies that uphold these practices should build with the
natural environment and take natural processes into account, incorporate greenspace effectively
and rely less on structural adjustments as a means to build into hazard areas. Economic
development on the other hand is defined by its interactions with heavy structural adjustments
and its prioritization of economic advancement at the expense of long-term community safety. In
my analysis, I attempted to classify policies passed by the city of Central and Ascension, East
Baton Rouge and Livingston parishes by these definitions. Rather than observe each law or
policy as whole parts, I reviewed each as pieces of whole, defining sections and articles. Flood
14

Raymond Burby. "Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise
Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas,” 173
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hazard stipulations are often buried in policies that address larger issues, such as transportation
and infrastructure development so this was necessary to most accurately capture all ordinances
and policies.
Table 1.1. Defining Elements of Safe and Economic Development
Safe Development vs. Economic Development in the Floodplain: Definitions
Safe Development
Builds with the environment, taking natural
processes into account

Economic Development
Builds against the environment, not taking
natural processes into account

Incorporates greenspace in flood hazard areas

Does not adequately incorporate greenspace

Less of a reliance on structural adjustments for
long-term adaptation

Prioritizes economic advancement at the expense
of community safety

Can come at the expense of potential economic
growth, even though homes are safer

Heavier reliance on structural adjustments (i.e.
flood walls, levees)

in trying to make hazardous areas safer, the
federal government in fact substantially increases
the potential for catastrophic property damages
and economic loss.
Housing costs may rise due to larger lot sizes and Housing costs may be lower, due to more densely
fewer homes in the area
populated areas
Source: Author
Residential areas may be much less densely
populated, allowing for adequate runoff

Many of the public policy documents were available online through MuniCode.
However, since Central incorporated in 2005 and my research dated back to 1983, it was
necessary to review earlier East Baton Rouge (EBR) Parish policies that guided development for
the time period from 1983 to 2005. This required me to visit the EBR Parish court house several
times to examine hard copies of older documents. I also did a fair amount of comparative
analysis between East Baton Rouge and Livingston and Ascension parishes, which required trips
to the respective parish seats of Denham Springs and Gonzalez as well. Disaster plans and
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) maps were available through the
9

Cartographic Information Center (CIC) at Louisiana State University. These were utilized in an
effort to understand how exactly the floodplain was developed and to look at how flood
insurance has changed over time. I focused on issues that are lacking in floodplain management
in the United States, especially the failure of mitigation procedures to contain increasing
exposure to older buildings due to new development and the lack of local planning and
mitigation for prior the encroachment of coastal influences. I additionally focused on the
progression of zoning and development practices, specifically looking for information on
subdivision development in relationship to major past floods. This was particularly important in
Central, which incorporated in 2005. It was clear that there were several subdivisions were
permitted in high hazard areas.
In addition to the analysis of public policies, I conducted a series of interviews to
gauge local residents’ views on flooding, and if they had noticed policies change over the years.
People lived in the territory that became Central in 2005 and were familiar with the landmark
flood of 1983. Interviews enabled the collection of first-hand accounts of floods from earlier
years. I used the snowball method to find interview subjects, where interviewees were able to
recommend me to other residents who were willing to be interviewed. This method is
particularly suitable when the population of interest is hard to reach and compiling a list of the
population may be challenging; Central is a very tight-knit community, and I hoped that by
relying on initial interviewees passing on information, I was able to gain a varied sample of truly
invested community members.15 I began with local officials, first interviewing the Floodplain
Manager for the city of Central and the Director of Public Works. From there, I was able to get
in contact with other residents of Central, and I additionally put a press release in the local
15

Patrick Biernacki, and Dan Waldorf. "Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral
Sampling." Sociological Methods & Research 10, no. 2 (1981): 141-163.
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newsletter, CentralSpeaks. Lastly, I contacted the science teachers at Central High School and
was able to interview several of the teachers. I was able to interview a broad range of
individuals, with ranges in education level, income, flood experiences, and involvement in civic
activities.
It was also my intention to work with local government directly to see what local
leaders perceived in terms of policy changes. I interviewed two former city council members and
a sitting member of the United States House of Representatives and was able to discuss policy
evolution and next steps as we look to the future of floodplain management in Louisiana. They
were able to provide me with varying viewpoints outlining the formation of Central and the
expansion of this northeast corner of East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole.
I was additionally able to utilize resources from the LSU Coastal Sustainability
Studio (CSS), where I work. External funds support the Inland from the Coast Project, which is
an interdisciplinary undertaking in the greater Baton Rouge and tri-Parish area. I benefitted from
other participants in the study who were using several similar resources, such as zoning
ordinances, flood ordinances, housing development and subdivision construction records to gain
insight into how exactly Central has developed into the floodplain. Additionally by assisting in a
set of scenario building workshops conducted in EBR and Livingston parishes, I was able to
better integrate the policy analysis and interviews I conducted in Central. After conducting the
interviews I worked to plug in what people’s perceptions around flooding meant. I looked to see
how their actions and words following the floods had been translated into policy. This was done
by looking for common themes in the interviews such as opinions on state/federal support, length
of time they had resided in the area and prior experiences with flooding.

11

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: FLOOD POLICY, RESILIENCE & CASE STUDIES

This literature review contains three distinct subject areas on flood risk and mitigation.
First, it focuses on national flood management policy, centering on the origins of floodplain
management with the eventual passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and the
subsequent formation and progress of the National Flood Insurance Program. Prior to these
measures, the majority of floodplain management was: (a) conducted on a local level and (b)
highly focused on structural fortifications, as discussed in the works of Gilbert White and his
students. Their work acts as a springboard for the analysis of future flood policy in the United
States. Second, I dissect the existing literature on community resilience and examine the role that
memory studies can play in foregrounding the experiences and responses to past floods and their
incorporation in legislative policies, especially on a local level. Lastly, the literature review
covers a variety of case studies of floodplain management seen in specific U.S. cities and in
response to specific events such as flooding in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Rapid City, South Dakota,
Ellicott City, Maryland and the 1993 Mississippi River floods. To best analyze this body of
work, I will rely upon floodplain manager’s literature as well as case studies from the time of
occurrence. This literature comes together to help answer the questions of safe vs. economic
development and to better analyze flood hazard mitigation policies.
2.1. History of Floodplain Management: An Academic & Policy Framework
Gilbert White and his contemporaries are regarded as the parents of floodplain
management in the United States. In his most famous work, White covers the classification and
identification of adjustments to flooding in the United States, perceptions of natural hazards, and

12

choice of natural hazard adjustments.16 Adjustments to flooding are defined as either structural or
nonstructural. He advocated, where feasible, a shift away from the structural solutions that
dominated policy in the early twentieth century. These structural adjustments, developed
by engineers, seek to protect humans from the risk of inundation and enable them to continue
living in flood prone areas.17 White's non-structural adjustments advocated for policies imposed
by a governing body (local, regional, or national) to restrict the use of floodplains, or human
adjustments to flood risk that do not involve heavy investment in flood controls, such as
developing infrastructure to accommodate natural processes and rather promoted adhering to
safer long-term development policies.18 In his influential dissertation entitled "Human
Adjustment to Floods," White argued that an overreliance on structural works in the United
States had increased, rather than decreased, damage from flooding. In short, public confidence
in structural works increased occupancy of, and the pace of construction on, floodplains.19 He
argued in this work – deemed by several commentators to be the most important contribution
made by a geographer in twentieth -century North America20 – that "floods are an act of God, but
flood losses are largely an act of man."21
Design standards are sometimes inappropriate or inadequate based on short-term flood
records and foster overconfidence in structures, resulting in catastrophic infrastructure disasters
16

Neil Macdonald, David Chester, Heather Sangster, Beverly Todd, and Janet Hooke. "The Significance of Gilbert
F. White’s 1945 Paper ‘Human Adjustment to Floods’ in the Development of Risk and Hazard
Management." Progress in Physical Geography 36, no. 1 (2012): 125-133.
17
Ibid. 130
18
Burrell E Montz,, Graham A. Tobin, and Ronald R. Hagelman. Natural Hazards: Explanation and Integration.
(New York: Guilford Publications, 2017.)
19
Gilbert F. White. "Human Adjustment to Floods: A Geographical Approach to the Flood Problems in the United
States " PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, (1945).
20
Robert E. Hinshaw. Living with Nature's Extremes: The Life of Gilbert Fowler White. (Boulder, CO: Big Earth
Publishing , 2006) // Robert Kates, Craig E. Colten, Shirley Laska, and Stephen P. Leatherman. "Reconstruction of
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective." Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 103, no. 40 (2006): 14653-14660.
21
Gilbert F. White. "Human Adjustment to Floods: A Geographical Approach to the Flood Problems in the United
States" 2.
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if a flood breaches hard defenses. A recent and relevant example of the impacts of undue
confidence in structural works can be seen in Hurricane Katrina's impact on New Orleans, during
the summer of 2005. Historically, at least in the U.S., certain design specifications had to be met
(for example, to adhere to the 100-year flood requirement). In instances where high water
exceeds the design specifications (in the case of a 150-year flood), the levees have failed, thus
causing catastrophic loss in overdeveloped floodplains.22 In their landmark work, The
Environment as Hazard, Burton, Kates and White make the case for adjustments as a way to
adapt to flooding in certain areas without turning to structural methods.23 These so called
“adjustments” are ways to mitigate flood impacts both proactively and retroactively. However,
while the themes the authors cover relating to the development (or rather, their pursuit of more
limited development) of the floodplain are well founded, they make several assumptions about
human behavior that still effect how these ideals are actually carried out even today. In the bestcase scenario it may be that adjustments, whether in resource use or hazard mitigation, come
mostly from "the ways people (1) recognize and describe specific hazards, (2) consider how they
might deal with it, and (3) choose among the actions that seem available to them."24 This view
has potential for problems to arise as it can be difficult to predict how people will react and make
decisions in times of disaster. They also discuss “bounded rationality,” acknowledging that
rationality can be limited by a variety of factors such as the time available to make the decision,
the actual cognitive limitations of the mind and the seriousness of the problem. In the ideal of
Herbert Simon and collaborators, people are sometimes looking for the most satisfactory solution

22

Gilbert F. White. Changes in Urban Occupancies of Flood Plains in the United States. Vol. 57. University of
Chicago, 1958. Burby, Raymond J. "Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The US Experience." Global
Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards 3, no. 3 (2001): 111-122.
23
Ian Burton, Kates RW, White G.F.. The Environment as Hazard. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1978).
24
Ibid. 45
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rather than the most optimal or rational one.25 I believe it is safe to say that in times of crisis,
humans are less likely to be rational.
Prior to 1968, flood policy in the United States was in existence but varied in its
effectiveness. In 1917, a flood control act was approved that appropriated $45 million for a longrange flood control plan of the lower Mississippi and Sacramento Rivers (leaning heavily on
only levee construction), however, the 1927 Great Mississippi River Flood showcased the
problems with the “levees only” policies that were enacted earlier, prompting further
amendments.26 Responsibilities of flood recovery generally fell on individual citizens, or at most
on local governments. A coordinated response was not the norm or common until 1950 when the
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 was passed, which provided a framework for regular assistance when
necessary to states from the federal government.27 Prior to this disaster relief was common, but
strictly on a case by case basis, with no real unifying element.28 This was critical in that it created
the first permanent system for disaster relief without the need for congressional action. Flood
policy continued to ramp up through the 1950s and while the U.S. had seen a long history of loss
of property and life due to flooding, renewed continuous demand for federal reform did not come
until after Florida and Louisiana suffered immense damage after Hurricane Betsy in 1965. 29
While White had lobbied for flood insurance for years, Knowles and Kunreuther outline how
Congress’s National Flood Insurance Act did not unfold as Gilbert White would have wished it
to. After the 1965 storm, Congress called for the formation of the “Task Force on Federal Flood

25

Richard Cyert., Herbert A. Simon, and Donald B. Trow. "Observation of a Business Decision." The Journal of
Business 29, no. 4 (1956): 237-248.
26
American Institutes for Research. “A Chronology of Major Events Effecting the National Flood Insurance
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Policy,” chaired by White, to study the issue and make recommendations.30 White’s report
stressed that flood insurance should serve a dual purpose: not only to offer financial relief to
flood victims, but also to take a lead role in directing land use and development—or rather
restriction of development—in the nation’s floodplains.31 The report was optimistic, suggesting
that with a comprehensive effort at studying floodplain management, a flood insurance program
could take hold and succeed. Congress did not head this advice and did not adequately address
land use and development and passed the National Flood Insurance Act well before White felt it
was ready.32 The most prominent thing to rise out of the National Flood Insurance Act was the
creation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).While it was clear that some form of
federal management was deeply needed, the NFIP has proved to be a controversial solution for
many. Major amendments were made to the act in 1969, 1974 and 1994.33 More recently, the
passage of the Biggert-Waters Act in 2012 was divisive and has required further amendments in
the form of the 2014 Homeowner Affordability Act.34 Even now the NFIP flounders; debt ridden
and viewed wearily by those who live in the floodplain, always unsure what help will come
when they are affected. The truth of Gilbert White’s predictions that it would not succeed unless
a smaller amount of attention was focused specifically on providing federally subsidized flood
insurance and more attention be directed to the comprehensive management of development on
the floodplain persists to the present day.
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The program’s implementation was a long time in the making and had two main goals at
the time of its inception: (1) To provide flood insurance for structures and their contents in
communities that adopted and enforced an ordinance outlining minimal floodplain management
standards and (2) To identify areas of high and low flood hazard and establish flood insurance
rates for structures inside each flood hazard area.35 Defining the areas of high flood hazard, or
the floodplain, is one of the biggest debates in floodplain management. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) received the mandate to define the floodplain. Land area that
would be inundated by a base flood (the flood area that has a chance of being equaled in a given
year) is considered the floodplain. This is also commonly known as a 100-year flood – or the
area with a 1 percent chance of flooding each year. The National Flood Insurance Act and the
NFIP refer to these areas as “special flood hazard areas” or SFHA’s.36 These areas are
susceptible to floods, and thus are likely to endure repeat flooding. The NFIP has covered more
than 30,000 “severe repetitive loss properties” (SRLPs) across the United States. These
properties have flooded an average of five times, according to FEMA.37 The NFIP funds
rebuilding in place, and the absence of an alternative formula is a costly component of the NFIP.
Homeowners might prefer to relocate to higher ground in some cases, which would spare them
the trauma of enduring and recovering from repeat flooding. This would also spare taxpayers the
expense of rebuilding the same properties after every flood. But the NFIP’s current structure
does little to incentivize this approach as discussed in a July 2017 NRDC (Natural Resource
Defense Council) report.38 Most NFIP assistance goes toward elevating homes on pilings or
35

FEMA. The National Flood Insurance Program. Accessed 24 September 2019: https://www.fema.gov/nationalflood-insurance-program
36
FEMA. Defining the Flood Zone. Accessed 24 September 2019: https://www.fema.gov/special-flood-hazard-area
37
Rob Moore. National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Issue Brief. Seeking Higher Ground: How to Break
the Cycle of Repeated Flooding with Climate-Smart Flood Insurance Reforms. (Washington, D.C.: NRDC, July
2017). Accessed on 13 October 2019: https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/climate-smart-flood-insurance-ib.pdf
38
Ibid. 3

17

raising their foundations, though some assistance still does go to homeowners.39 As sea levels
rise in coastal areas and larger floods become increasingly likely along inland rivers due to more
copious rainfall, increased elevation may only serve as a temporary fix. The number of flood
damage claims paid by the NFIP would be lowered by buyouts and would also enable
homeowners and their families to move to safer neighborhoods and avoid the hardship of
additional floods.40 Relocation is a potential solution that falls in line with safe development
principles.
Participation in the NFIP is based on an agreement between local communities and the
federal government that asserts that if a community will adopt and enforce some sort of
floodplain management ordinance of their own design (that also meets federal standards) to
reduce future flood risks on new construction in SFHA’s, the federal government will make
flood insurance available within that community for financial and property security.41 Flood
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS) depict SFHA’s and other risk premium zones in participating
communities. These maps are readily available to the public. The initial goal of this system was
to provide a consistent method for delimiting and alerting the public to flood risk. Ultimately
these maps would help to lower future flood damage by providing protection for property owners
against potential losses through an insurance mechanism that requires a premium to be paid for
that protection and through community floodplain management ordinances. However, a report
from the General Accounting Office (USGAO) in 2003 exposed that repetitive loss properties
actually cost the program about $200 million annually.42 When Congress first passed the NFIP,
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the goal was that flood insurance premiums would cover operating expenses and flood insurance
claims. However, as Kriesel and Landry state, the NFIP ends up borrowing from the U.S.
Treasury at times when losses are heavy and the loans are subsequently paid back with interest.
Storms that inflict significant damage and require significant insurance claims, such as Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 and Superstorm Sandy in 2012, test this financial arrangement.43 Between 1978
and 2014, the U.S. federal government paid more than $51 billion in claims under the National
Flood Insurance Program; as of 2019, the program had accumulated $25 billion in debt.44
Congress had modified the program through a series of amendments over the years.
During its first decade, there was low subscribership. Kriesel and Landry assert that when
Congress created the NFIP, people still believed strongly in self-insurance or adaptation
strategies and were distrustful of formal federal insurance, especially in small coastal
communities that we see in Louisiana.45 The first major amendment came in 1973, which made
the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for property owners in participating communities as a
condition to receive federal financial assistance within the SFHA’s.46 Later came the National
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 which set up the Community Rating System (CRS), an
incentive program that encourages communities to go above the minimal federal requirements
for limiting floodplain development.47 Landry reaffirms the ideas of Gilbert White by stating that
extensive development in floodplains and a high rate of population growth in low-lying and
coastal areas have increased human beings’ exposure to flood hazard. He suggests that the
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communities that implement hazard mitigation planning and management activities recover
faster from disaster than those communities that do not, are less prone to flood hazards and that
the CRS does in fact have an impact on encouraging individual communities to proactively plan
for flood damage.48
Major and controversial reform came in 2012 with the passage of the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act. Prior to Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the NFIP’s debt rang in at about
$17 billion.49 One of the main reasons for passing Biggert-Waters was to ensure that the
premiums matched the flood insurance payments, transitioning away from the common practice
of charging subsidized, or artificially low rates, which made the program actuarially unsound.50
The changes to the NFIP imposed by the Biggert-Waters Act produced major increases in
insurance premiums to individuals, causing a large stir on the national stage. Shortly after
Congress the Biggert-Waters, The Water Institute of the Gulf published a report outlining some
of the projected changes that would result. Based on its findings (centered on a study of
insurance rates in Fargo) they suggest property owners and local policy makers feared that the
impending increase in insurance rates might render some properties un-marketable in the future
and constitute a serious threat to the long-term value of property, the real estate market, local
businesses, lending institutions, and entire communities.51 While the full extent of the act had yet
to be determined, the risk of future strain on the reserves and resources in the system continues to
be a concern as outlined in the 2013 GAO report on the state of the NFIP.52 The outcry following
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the passage of the Biggert Waters Act led to the subsequent passage of the Homeowners Flood
Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. While academic literature on the impacts of this act
specifically are lacking, Carolyn Kousky, of the Wharton Risk Center, published a report on
premiums and homeowner affordability soon after its passage. The factors that influence NFIP
full-risk premiums vary by flood zone, such as elevation above base flood elevation (BFE),
whether or not a basement exists, and the type of property. The GAO raised concerns that some
of the data used in FEMA modeling were outdated or inaccurate prior to the passage of either
aforementioned act. FEMA continually works to update FIRMs and make other improvements,
but certain items, such as probability estimates of floods of different magnitudes, have not been
updated in decades.53 This exposed the need for reform. Starting in 2015 (after the Homeowner
Affordability Act was passed) FEMA put in place limits to keep insurance spikes below 18
percent per year and discounted rates were made available upon application.54
Flood policy in the United States has followed a long and winding road. The transition
from self-implemented adjustments and insurances to large scale flood policy on the national
stage came at a time of remarkable population change and upheaval in how people develop the
coast and riparian floodplains (with the speed of development contributing to a proclivity
towards economic development practices). Throughout the development of these policies in the
U.S., we have seen the persistence of the ideas presented by early academics, such as Gilbert
White. These ideas of not just limiting, but changing how we develop the floodplain, are critical
to moving forward flood policy on the national stage. While economic priorities may have been
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the norm in the past, we must work to implementing safer development policies as we move
forward.
2.2. On Memory, Resilience & Collective Action
Social memory has been summarized by historians as the “community’s collective
values, beliefs, and practices as expressed though the creation and retention of particular
narratives about the past.”55 Adger defines resilience as the ability of groups or communities to
deal with with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political, and
environmental change.56 This literature review first considers the early contributors in social
memory studies and its origins in psychology and sociology. I then outline the growth of
resilience studies in the geographic discipline, focusing on its ability to be used as a call to action
for communities. I use this as a starting point to examine how geographical scholarship has more
recently presented social memory (or “collective memory”) and resilience in diverse ways to
produce measurable change in relation to natural hazards mitigation. I also discuss ideas of place
attachment and collective local action in the context of flood hazard mitigation schemes.
Most modern usages of the term “social memory” find their roots in the work of Maurice
Halbwachs and his work, On Collective Memory. He argues that while it is individuals who
remember, they rely on a specific group context, whether it is social class, family, or trade union,
to remember elements of the past.57 In this book Halbwachs engages with the ideas of
philosopher Emile Durkheim. They differ in their discussion of “collective effervescence,”
which Durkenheim centers around ceremonies such as festivals and dances, whereas Halbwachs
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sought to explain what binds people together in the everyday, arguing that collective memory
fills the gaps between these “effervescent” periods. When it comes to flood mitigation, those
periods between times of “effervescence” are critical in the utilization of a collective memory.
Mitigation measures are most effectively enacted proactively, between times of large-scale
disasters, not right after a catastrophic event occurs. This can become problematic as a sense of
urgency erodes as you move further away from the time of disaster – memory loses its power.
One of On Collective Memory’s most prominent themes is that “memory is not benign, but is a
tool used in the active reconstruction of the past in an image that corresponds with the needs of
the present.”58 It is in the hands of societal groups to revise their past; this is especially
applicable to the field of natural hazards research. Halbwachs also shows how our collective
conscious can sometime distort past events: “Society from time to time obligates [that] people
not just reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up... we give
them a prestige that reality did not possess.”59 For the purposes ascribed to this thesis, social
memory can be used as tool for action. However, to be successful in this endeavor, researchers
and local community members alike must be careful not to ascribe traits to an event in an effort
to fit the needs of the time. In other words work must be done to ensure that memory is utilized
in as objective and accurate a way as possible.
Sociologists Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, who penned “Social Memory Studies:
From ‘Collective Memory’ to Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” point to other
explanations for the increase in public interest in memory over the twenty years. They state that
the most significant influences on public interest are the lingering aspects of 1960s-1970s
political culture which identified historiography as a source of cultural upheaval, challenged the
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conceptual roots of a linear portrayal of history and “truth,” and reflected a renewed interest in
socially based theories of memory use.60 The next work of critical importance to the field is
James Fentress and Chris Wickham’s book, Social Memory. It is a challenge to Halbwachs’
central notion that memory is mostly collective and structured by group identities. Fentress and
Wickham believe that this collectivized focus has neglected the importance of individual
consciousness.61 They are directly concerned with public and social aspects of memory,
including the formal recreation and memorialization of the past, which are prominent themes in
the field also suggested by other scholars. The experiences of individual people in a community
are just as important to memory studies as are the collective efforts of a whole group of people.
We can look forward the case studies presented in the next section of this literature review to see
this. As Rahn remarked in his paper, it was the actions of individual dedicated local government
officials that helped get the idea for the Rapid City greenway off the ground and sustain longterm public support. But as the 1972 disaster moves further into the rearview mirror, people are
beginning to forget. The city now faces pressure to build additional buildings along the greenway
that will reduce the efficacy of the flood control efforts.62 Perhaps the memory of the flood is no
more than 25 years, or just beyond one generation’s recollection?
Geographers have utilized social memory studies across a vast array of individual
disciplines, especially in partnership with issues of resilience. Thomas Wilbanks defines resilient
communities as those regions that maintain four key elements that enable: the ability to
anticipate disruptive events, the capability to respond to them effectively, the mechanisms to
recover from them equitably and efficiently, and take steps to reduce vulnerabilities to future
60
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events.63 Memory is a means to meet a more resilient future. Memory can be active; it is passed
down over generations and ensures that essential knowledge and traditional ways of life remain a
part of the present. Communities in Louisiana have persisted in precarious places for much of the
states’ history, whether it is the hurricane prone communities on the southeast coast or inland
communities that face the constant threat of river floods. The endurance of these communities is
an indication that ideas of resilience were inherent even before the academic study and
applications of the concept began. A major concept in resilience studies is that human societies
can use their accumulated social memory to better contend with future catastrophes by applying
what they have learned from past hazard events.64 In their paper “Social Memory and Resilience
in New Orleans,” Colten and Sumpter suggest that a lack of reliance on social memory played a
role in the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina.65 Following the devastation brought by
Hurricane Betsy in 1965, New Orleans took remarkable steps to attempt to increase their
resilience and reduce their vulnerability to future storm of similar strength. Congress almost
immediately set in motion the first major project to reduce future hurricane impacts. It
appropriated funds for the Corps of Engineers to begin detailed planning and construction of a
massive hurricane protection system for southeast Louisiana – the infamous levee system which
failed 50 years later during Hurricane Katrina.66 The levee system created a false sense of
security and allowed people to heavily develop the floodplain, causing them to forget the
destruction brought in 1965.67 Resilience resides, in part, in the ability to draw on past
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experiences and is inherently historical – both formally and informally. Countries, communities,
organizations and individuals are all subject to a diverse and ever changing environment. The
threats that this sometimes turbulent environment poses can vary in both severity and frequency
and require the expertise local to a specific area to learn and grow from past natural hazards.68
Raymond Burby introduces the notion of government policy paradoxes in his landmark work on
government response to disasters.69 As mentioned earlier, this work presents the two main
paradoxes that plague governments when it comes to hazard risk reduction; the safe development
and the local government’s paradox. He makes the case that no matter how well intentioned
policies are out the outset, if they set communities up for catastrophe down the line, they are
making it extremely difficult for communities to exhibit resilience to storms.
Perhaps most relevant to the work in this thesis is the idea of “sustainable flood memory”
put forth by McEwan. She defines this memory as community focused, archival, integrating
individual/personal and collective/community experiences.70 It subsequently addresses the
unique battle between memories of past flood events and their role in changing hydrological and
socioeconomic environments. Her research projects explore how the concept of memory can
help understand processes of informal social learning and community that might be supported in
flood risk management, and how this may strengthen community resilience to future floods. She
asserts that a focus on memory can stipulate a more dynamic outlook on the relationship between
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past and future floods.71 Better integrating local knowledge into flood recovery efforts requires
this kind of adaptive and fluid knowledge.
Ideas of social resilience in academic literature rose from previously established ideas
and works on ecological resilience. Perhaps the most prevalent work on ecological resilience,
Holling’s Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems asserts that resilience is dependent on
gradual change of an ecosystem.72 He raises the point that quantitative changes to ecosystem
stability can both be a result of and influence qualitative changes on the human scale. Resilience
has a variety of interpretations and definitions. It is the buffer capacity or the “ability of a system
to absorb perturbations, or the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system
changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior.”73 By
contrast other definitions of resilience emphasize how quick the recovery is after a disturbance,
highlighting the difference between resilience and resistance, where the latter is the extent to
which disturbance is actually transformed into a tangible impact.
Adger later proclaims that a link exists between social and ecological resilience,
particularly for social groups or communities that rely on ecological and environmental resources
for their livelihoods.74 His article examines whether resilience is a useful characteristic for
describing the social and economic situation of social groups and examines where links between
social resilience and ecological resilience take shape, the roots of which he states are in human
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ecology, ecological economics and rural sociology.75 He also reminds academics that resilience
functions in conjunction with issues of vulnerability. He additionally emphasizes that social
memory lives with people, institutions and places, and it that it results from the combined effects
of knowledge, skills and experience that make up a community’s memory. Susan Cutter defines
vulnerability as the potential for loss following a triggering event.76 If a community is
particularly vulnerable to a certain type of hazard then their resilience or ability to recover would
certainly decrease. This type of research should work to mediate vulnerability and promote
adaptive action and resilience. Cutter also states that while vulnerability as potential exposure or
social response pervades the existing literature (especially at that time), a direction emerged that
combined elements of the two, but it was inherently more geographically centered. In this
perspective, vulnerability is conceived as both a biophysical risk as well as an indicator of
sensitivity to risk, but within a specific areal or geographic domain.77 This could relate to
geographic space (where vulnerable people and places are located), or social space (who in those
selected places are most vulnerable).
2.3. Case Studies
As demonstrated thus far, problems associated with flooding are not new issues in the
United States. Cities that lie along rivers across the country face these potential hazards from the
forces of nature and resources that also sustain them. The literature on flood hazards is bursting
with evidence of rising annual flood losses despite increasing federal spending on engineering
protection works and of calls for new options to help create a social structure capable of
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modifying human behavior in ways likely to decrease rather than increase flood loss potentials.78
This issue is discussed at length on the national stage, but before one can jump into looking at
better ways to reconcile different flood mitigation strategies in Louisiana specifically, it is
imperative to have an understanding of what has not proven successful elsewhere in the United
States. I have selected literature focusing on areas that have either established “successful” flood
mitigation strategies or have similar characteristics and problems that we see in southeast
Louisiana, especially in inland communities.
Tulsa is often discussed as the crowning jewel of flood mitigation works in the United
States. Its “greenway” is enviable and the turnaround following a history of floods in the early to
mid-1900s is remarkable. Its development of a mixed mitigation scheme including both
structural and nonstructural controls along Mingo Creek is of particular interest. Meo, Ziebro and
Patton explore the ties between policy innovation and community-led action and how these
things came together to encourage an overall trend towards sustainability on a large scale in
Tulsa.79 Their work cemented the idea that large-scale change and innovation came from the
dedication of a few persistent individuals. Observation of specific strategies implemented was
also crucial.
Tulsa’s transition away from repeat flood victim began following the 1984 Memorial Day
flood, which saw over $180 million in damages for the city.80 Tulsa adopted an innovative
program that enabled the city, in partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
to design and construct a flood control system made up of a network of landscaped detention
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basins along Mingo Creek, land-use reforms and leadership changes in local city government
that have helped the city become a leader in flood hazard mitigation in the nation.81 In his 2001
paper, Meo asserts that the reason that Tulsa found success in its mitigation programs can be
attributed almost entirely to the actions of several so called “strategic policy innovators.”82 Meo
references the works of early scholar Kingdon in his examinations of the early roles of
innovators in local government. Kingdon notably argued that conditions for innovation in
government are most favorable when local politics, the problem at hand, and policy momentum
come together at a “window of opportunity.”83
The biggest benefit in the Tulsa procedure appears to be the sustained support of the
voting public in the years following each bout of flooding the city endured. Meo proposes that
the main “window of opportunity” that the city seized was that which followed the 1984 floods,
but I would suggest that Tulsa succeeded because of the incremental but noticeable success they
saw as a result of their efforts over a long period of time (and a consistent, dedicated funding
stream). This is supported by Anne Patton, an instrumental member of the team that built up
Tulsa’s flood-control and hazard mitigation programs, who in her 1994 article states that change
began in 1984 with the formation of the advocacy group Tulsans for a Better Community,
ramped up in 1990 after a change in the organizational makeup of Tulsa’s city government (a
switch from commission to mayor-council form), and culminated in 1997 with a collaboration
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that resulted in the grant that would
become known as Project Impact.84 Project Impact’s biggest strides were made in solidifying
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public-private partnerships and in conveying the importance of pre-hazard planning practices.
After the Project Impact grant expired, the city and other private sponsors continued to fund the
programs that had been set up, having recognized the importance of continuity. By 2000, the city
had helped to establish the 501-C-3 program Tulsa Partners Inc. which now permanently works
to mobilize public and provide donation sources and create new and innovative programs.85 In
short, the Tulsa method is sustainable – something that is not always seen in flood control and
mitigation plans.
Rapid City, South Dakota is another example of a place that has risen above its flood
problems and created lasting solutions. Following the flood of 1972, the floodplain
redevelopment included prioritizing a greenway along the creek and public open space to
accommodate floodwaters. The well implemented and innovative management scheme received
widespread praise. The city’s greenway is considered an outstanding example of efficient multiobjective use space in a floodplain.86
The Black Hills make Rapid City and its surrounding communities susceptible to extreme
flooding. There is often little time to warn residents of flood threats since rainfall usually is
intense and over steep watersheds.87 In 1972 catastrophic rainfall amounting to about 15 inches
in 6 hours88 befell the Black Hills neighboring Rapid City. The rains caused record-breaking
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floods on streams draining the eastern slopes of the Black Hills and caused a reservoir dam to
fail. Over 200 lives were lost and the USACE estimated the damage to be near $120 million.89
Several things came together after the 1972 flood to ensure that the damages incurred at
the time would not be repeated. Almost immediately following, the city approved a floodplainmanagement program that came to be known as the “greenway” concept and money from HUD
and used some nonfederal sources to convert most of the floodplain into a large park. The city
purchased the lots and the remains of the buildings within the floodway, and sold the flooddamaged structures. The buildings were either moved to new locations or demolished by salvage
operators.90 Several picnic areas or low-maintenance grasslands have been established. A large
natural area that has been planted with native species was put in as well as several ponds and iceskating rinks. A bike path traverses the entire floodway from end to end.91 The floodway has
been met with great success both in an engineering sense and in terms of local public acceptance.
As we move further from when hazards strike however, people tend to forget past difficulties. In
recent years, there has been pressure to permit increased commercialization of the floodway. 92
So far, the City Planning Commission and the City Council have not succumbed to these
pressures. The strong memory of the 1972 flood has deterred this proposed encroachment.
However, just three years following the flood a new high school and civic center were built on
the floodway fringe area, despite widespread objection to the location. City engineers
emphasized that the buildings were of massive brick construction and that people would have
ample warning to evacuate them in the event of a flood. These decisions on the parts of city
officials, in addition to the prevalent role of social memory plays on floodplain settlement will be
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discussed at length later in this literature review. I would argue that what makes the South
Dakota case exceptional is this long standing attitude towards deterring development on the
greenway. The key to this success lies in the attitudes and perspectives of the people who call
Rapid City home. The greenway is a beloved part of the city so regardless of resident’s
knowledge of flooding or memory of the events of 1972 they will advocate for the greenway.
Having the sustained support of the community has made Rapid City the example it stands as
today.
The Great Flood of 1993 (Mississippi River) was one of the next major hazard events to
strike the United States. The event was one of the costliest disasters in the United States at the
time, with damages coming in at about $15 billion and effecting 745 miles of the basin on the
river and inland. Above average rainfall that began early in the year in Iowa and Missouri,
coupled with a heavy summer rainy season led to catastrophic flooding on the upper Mississippi
River and its tributaries.93 Of the cities affected, Davenport, Iowa is one that faced a particularly
hazardous summer and chose to implement natural flood control measures to help mitigate
effects of the disaster. Prior to the 1993 flood, a mid-1980s plan to help the federal government
build a $34 million floodwall was rejected by the city. They Instead chose to focus on buying out
low-lying properties and building flood resilient structures. After flooding in 1993, the city chose
to continue its current approach to flood resiliency instead of transitioning to committing to the
high cost of permanent flood barriers. They chose instead to opt for an environmentally sound
approach of embracing the natural flow of the river with parks, wetlands and flood-friendly
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buildings.94 They also utilize a flood warning system. Flooding is designed to happen in the
downtown area; during wet weather a portable bridge is floated to allow continued access to
home baseball games, parks line the river front and bike paths are the norm.95 Davenport offers
an adaptive approach to flood plain management. Rather than fighting to control the river, the
residents of Davenport have learned to live with it. In the aftermath of the 1993 flood, the
Midwest also saw success with the utilization of retreat as an adaptation measure. The town of
Valmeyer, Illinois (located just downriver from St. Louis, about 200 miles south of Davenport),
saw 16 feet of water inundate almost the entirety of the 900 person town.96 Valmeyer’s residents
voted to relocate to the top of a nearby bluff, rather than rebuild in place. The preference for a
collective relocation plan had become clear through a series of community meetings. The
community would have been dispersed by individual buyouts, while rebuilding to FEMA
floodplain elevation standards was undesirable for some and unaffordable for others. About twothirds of the town’s nine hundred residents eventually moved to the new site. The relocation took
twenty-two government agencies and $35 million in federal and state funding.97 Relocation is a
tangible example of a safe development practice.
In the management approach in Davenport we see some of the extraordinary levels of
individual commitment that were present in the Tulsa case. Following the 1993 flood a core
group of individuals spearheaded to effort to resist the government plan to build a floodwall,
stating that it would compromise the aesthetic value of the river and the way of life along it.
While this approach has generally worked for Davenport over the last 25 years, with a few
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especially wet years that saw flooding,98 it is important to take into consideration the
implications of the most recent 2019 floods on the area and how it will affect the city going
forward. These floods inundated the downtown area for almost 10 days after a temporary
floodwall put in place breached and before flood waters began to recede.99 The temporary
floodwall was thought to be a catch-all solution at the time but clearly did not pan out to be as
successful as the city hoped it would be. It begs the question: is it time to reconsider how
Davenport thinks about floodplain management or if coexistence with the Mississippi River is
still a viable form of flood hazard mitigation? While the flooding is inconvenient, the usage of a
greenway along the riverbanks avoided floods affecting homes or businesses since most of the
land touching the river is greenspace. Is this a fair risk for the people of Davenport to pay to be
able to enjoy the river when it is not at flood stage?
About 160 miles down the Mississippi River, the town of Hannibal, Missouri has taken
almost a completely opposite approach. In Hannibal, 34-foot-high levees stand between the town
and the river, looming ominously over the downtown area. By the time it reaches Hannibal, the
Mississippi is flowing quickly and is more than half a mile wide, but the walls completely
obstruct the river from view. Not only do the walls and levees visually block the river, residents
insist they simply make flooding worse.100 Under natural circumstances, the river would have
room to expand across the floodplain when it swells, whether that be from heavy rain or
excessive snowmelt. Instead, the levees (structural solutions) constrict the water to a narrow
passage, making the water rise higher and move faster as it flows downstream, often overtopping
the walls that are meant to confine it. In an analysis of the 1993 floods author Lee Larson asserts
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that this effect has stoked a certain amount of animosity between individual communities along
the river and provoked to so called “levee wars” that see some areas illegally increasing levee
heights, causing the water to crest over a surrounding neighborhood’s smaller or shorter levee.101
This is not the only setting where Missouri sees adjacent communities warring with one another.
Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas both sit on the Missouri River. In regards
to management, the sister city’s governments must work across city, county, and state lines to
provide successful basin-wide management to residents. In her recent environmental history of
the Kansas Cities, Amahia Mallea addresses the things that bind the cities together in their
pursuit of sustainable river management. While her work does not specifically touch on the river
in regards to floods (it focuses heavily on sewage and drinking water management), it does
highlight how the formation of the Mid-America Reginal Council (MARC) made great strides in
the collaborative management of the Kanas Cities’ resources. MARC functions as a Council on
Governments to encourage cooperation on issues that extend beyond the jurisdiction of a single
county, city, or state; one of the outcomes was the continuous concrete wall that contains the
river through both cities.102 Collaborative organizations that have a degree of government
oversight can be the key to better basin-wide management. It is clear that the state of
management in the Midwest has both successful aspects and flaws; it is important for officials in
Louisiana to be able to absorb and learn from these instances.
The last case study is that of Ellicott City, Maryland. The issues facing this settlement are
no surprise – the city lies in the lower reaches of an enclosed valley, causing the flood waters to

101

Ibid. 17
Amahia Mallea. A River in the City of Fountains: An Environmental History of Kansas City and the Missouri
River. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2018.
102

36

pool and then fill the downtown area, not unlike a swimming pool.103 Ellicott City experienced a
series of devastating floods very recently, in 2016 and 2018, which has yet to attract academic
literature on the topic of its floodplain management practices. However, the experiences of this
town are very similar to the community of Central, which this thesis will focus on; therefore
local newspaper accounts and governmental pieces provide documentation of this scenario.
Records show Ellicott City experienced flooding as far back as 1817. The town is prone
to flooding based on its location downhill from the Patapsco and Tiber rivers. In 2016, the region
saw 7 inches of rain in 2 hours causing catastrophic flash flooding and $22 million in damages in
addition to $42 million in lost economic activity for the tourist town. A number of expensive
mitigation strategies were discussed after the 2016 flood, most of which involved constructing
more stormwater ponds, building stream walls, widening the culverts beneath the streets, and
building parking garages engineered to catch stormwater. The city attempted to pass a
moratorium on new development, but did not pass.104 Accepting the characterization that the
storm was a 1 in 1,000 year event and was unlikely to occur again, the town rebuilt with the
overwhelming support of the tight knit community But two short years later Ellicott City faced
an eerily similar situation, exposing how fundamentally vulnerable the community truly was.
Following the floods of 2018, the town was slower to rebuild. They were swept into a local
political scuffle with leadership shifting in the middle of planning and dueling over ideas for how
to treat future floodplain management. One popular plan amongst officials included putting in a
greenway, similar to the systems in Rapid City, Tulsa, and Davenport. This approach faced
intense pushback from the community which insisted that the character of the town was tied to
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the historic buildings – tearing them down would be sacrilegious.105 This kind of resistance is
important to note, as it shows again, how the actions and voices of a few people can truly affect
the outcome of polices and ordinances that come to fruition. The people of Ellicott City are its
fabric, much like communities anywhere in the United States. But their commitment to the
historical integrity of the town, their reluctance to relocate is a spirit that is alive and well in
Louisiana and in Central. This begs the question, when does retreating rather than rebuilding
become the rational choice?
Conclusions
Flood hazard issues are incredibly diverse. To fully understand the best course of action
to deal with them, it is critical to have an understanding of the background of how the United
States came to have its current stances on flood recovery. From the early theories of Gilbert
White to the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act to the development of academic
literature to the roles that communities and individual people play, the United States has seen
intense growth of resources to deal with flood hazards. This literature review aimed to provide a
comprehensive background of three main categories: (1) the evolution of flood policy in the
United States, (2) a review of academic literature on social memory, resilience and the
importance of community led action, and (3) case studies of specific example as to how the
United States has applied flood hazard mitigation schemes in the recent past. I will now look to
apply these principles to the specific case of Central, Louisiana.
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CHAPTER 3. THE CITY OF CENTRAL: HISTORY, DISASTER, AND RESILIENCE

3.1. The City of Central
What is now the city of Central was long a collection of unincorporated suburbs
of East Baton Rouge Parish consisting of roughly 18,000 people.106 Even prior to the
unincorporated suburban development, the region was inhabited by Amite and Choctaw Native
Americans.107 Upon the arrival of European settlers, the main early economy consisted of cotton,
sweet potatoes and pine mills. Additionally the Greenwell Springs Resorts’ construction in the
mid 1800’s brought an influx of people to the area, with the natural springs rumored to sure any
disease of ailment.108 Down the line, Standard Oil come to town in 1909, shifting the economy
from agricultural to a more industrial focused economy. In 2005 residents voted to incorporate
their own city. The impetus for creating a separate jurisdiction was residents’ desire to create an
independent school system. To accomplish this goal, the state legislature required incorporation.
After incorporation, state voters passed a constitutional amendment authorizing the creation of
the Central Community School District in November 2006. The amendment authorized Central
to govern its own public school system.109 The appointment of a school board and superintendent
in 2007 allowed the first classes to begin in the 2007-2008 school year. Since its opening,
Central High School has skyrocketed to a top ranking among education institutions in the region
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and continues to excel academically. The city’s population has also risen from 18,000 at its
inception to over 26,000 in 2019.110
While the school system in Central flourishes now, the greater rural area around Central
has a fraught history with education and race relations. It is important to note the demographic
breakdown of Central; in 2000, prior to the breakaway, the town was 78 percent white.111 As of
the 2010 census this percentage had risen to 83.112 Just north of Central, lies what are known as
the Florida Parishes. This region was much slower to develop and remains largely rural, with a
fairly violent history of blood feuds and intense hostility to organized authority. 113 On the
education front, Louisiana struggled in the early days of integration. New Orleans pushed courtordered de-segregation efforts that resulted in “schools shifting from overwhelmingly white to
integrated and increasingly black and poor.” 114 East Baton Rouge schools went down a similar
road as similarly ordered de-segregation efforts in the 1980s led to a steady decline in white
students but an in increase in black students in parish schools.115 However, in addition to these
facts, it is crucial to understand why families leave integrated schools. Bankston and Caldas
assert that this so called “white flight” does not necessarily stem from racist attitudes. They argue
that families with the means choose to send their children to the schools that offer the best
education for their children, which leads them to avoid low-performing schools that may have
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more limited resources available. This could mean moving from cities to more middle class
suburbs. Central essentially arose as such a suburb of Baton Rouge. Despite being a relatively
new development, much of the recovery of Central following the flood can be attributed to an
immense sense of unity among the residents who moved. The preexisting condemnation of a
large government combined with the history of de-segregation in East Baton Rouge Parish
undoubtedly played a large role in creating that sense of unity. It created an insularity that no one
other those residents understood and was most certainly underscored by the creation of the new
school district as well. The shared goal to escape Baton Rouge and its associated social strife
contributed to unity and attachment to place and has subsequently affected the flood recovery
process.
Central operates its own police and fire departments, but the parish continues to provide
several other services, such as water, sewerage, and trash.116 The municipal government only has
three direct employees: the mayor, an assistant, and an administrative officer. Private companies
contract to provide the remainder of city services. The municipal government's only source of
revenue, since 2015, has been a 2 percent sales tax.117 In addition to making it difficult to
mobilize resources on short notice (such as when a hazard event occurs), decentralization of
local government lends itself to a less transparent form of governing and weaker relations with
residents. It can also mean less direct staff on hand. Flood mitigation and drainage authority are
shared between the floodplain administrator and the office of Public Works. Prior to the
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appointment of an official floodplain administrator, all these duties were carried out by the office
of Public Works, and the departments still work closely in tandem.118
3.2. Flood Risks
For most of the region’s settlement history since the 1700s, development avoided the
riskiest areas and previous floods were relatively inconsequential. During the early 1960s, few
people in Central had direct memories of the miseries of inundation. These kinds of memories
can directly impact public policy planning for flood hazards. Strong memories prompt avoidance
of floodplain development altogether; while weak memories allow the erection of structures in
the floodplain that allow an aggressive development scheme. As a response to an uptick in
flooding problems in Baton Rouge in the 1950s, the state and parish initiated channelization of
certain waterways north of the settlement areas in 1957 and shifted a majority of the problem to
the less densely populated areas of the parish, which at the time, included areas such as
Central.119 Prior to the 1983 flood, federal and local government had suggested a number of
structural works as the best alternatives to reduce flood losses. By 1965, public officials
recognized that flood damages were a growing problem, but some among them held the belief
that flood risks were devaluing existing properties and impeding development.120 Such attitudes
acknowledge past floods, but take the position that flood control can eliminate or dramatically
reduce risk. More importantly it helps to justify ideas that suggest that an economy must turn to
development to grow economically. In the early 1980s the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development (DOTD) undertook several studies to analyze the potential
costs and benefits of popular structural ideas (the Comite Diversion Canal and the Darlington
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Reservoir, both discussed at length later), though neither has seen great progress since. At the
time, Rod Emmer, the director of the Louisiana Floodplain Manager’s Association, saw the need
for more comprehensive management and called for a basin-wide flood reduction plan. This
proposal eventually resulted in the formation of the Amite Basin Drainage and Water
Conservation District, created to foster research about the proposed solutions and coordinate
basin wide management efforts.121 Emmer found that the 1983 flood along the Amite River was
the fourth in a decade, and that losses could have been reduced with proactive flood-reduction
projects.122 He also asserted that planners had repeatedly called for such action, and concluded
that the problem was not a failure to plan, but a failure to follow through and complete projects.
After the 1983 flood, additional dramatic floods occurred in 1990 and 1993. In 2001, Baton
Rouge saw 19 inches of rain over the course of two days as Tropical Storm Allison unleashed
extensive inundations.123 Even in the lead up to the August 2016 floods, in March that same year,
9-15 inches of rain fell and inundated much of the same area that was devastated later that
year.124
Following the 1983 flood, local officials began taking steps to improve flood protection
systems and reduce risk. This included raising and modifying highway bridges that impeded the
flow of river water, and upgrading levees and pumps to manage excess backwater flooding in the
lower reaches of the river basins.125 Following these floods, Baton Rouge and Denham Springs
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made some efforts to amend their floodplain building standards to reduce risk and public
officials secured authorization in 1986 for the Corps of Engineers to build a diversion canal to
redirect excess water from the upper Comite River basin to the Mississippi. Voters even
approved a tax to fund a portion of the project in 2000.126 A notable change took place in 1993,
when East Baton Rouge Parish required new construction to be built two feet above the base
flood elevation. This revised ordinance provided significantly higher levels of protection for new
homes, but it did not apply to existing structures, nor did it address the larger issue of basin-wide
runoff produced by multiple subdivisions. Consequently, sprawl continued, runoff increased, and
the number of homes at risk proliferated.127 While on the surface this is a clear picture of
economic development trouncing safe development opportunities, it is also important to note
some of the more subtle implications of these actions. In some cases, it is inevitable that the line
between safe and economic development can become blurred. Policymakers may set out with an
intent to pass a policy that promotes safer development but inadvertently bring about
consequences that trend more to economic development. For example, in trying to make
hazardous areas safer, the federal government in fact substantially increased the potential for
catastrophic property damages and economic loss. Although it appeared that the new base flood
elevation rules supported risk reduction; however, it proved difficult to sustain these actions in
the long run as more people moved into the community. An increasing population put pressure
on the community of Central to permit new construction and the lead up to the 2016 flood saw
several subdivisions developed in areas that were close to the river, where flooding was
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inevitable.128 A majority of Central land area lies in the 100-year floodplain and close to 90
percent of houses there sustained some damage in 2016, with many of the houses used slab-ongrade construction.129
Development that encroached into flood prone areas for economic gain was not an issue
unique to the greater Baton Rouge area; it was also a prominent problem down the Mississippi
River in New Orleans. Burby asserts that the extensive damage in New Orleans due to Hurricane
Katrina and the trend in increasing numbers and severity of disasters are the completely
predictable outcomes of well-intentioned, but short-sighted, public policy decisions at all levels
of government.130 This was clearly demonstrated in the decision to build the levee system that
encircles much of New Orleans. Similar to the timeline in Baton Rouge, Orleans and Jefferson
parishes endured nineteen damaging flood events and eighteen hurricane events – almost one per
year – over the twenty-three year period between 1978 and 2000.131 Given this extreme level of
risk and exposure Congress authorized federal assistance for levees that would make it possible
to convert 9,600 acres from wetland to productive development use following devastating
hurricane losses in 1947.132 These levees would help prevent a recurrence of the losses
experienced from the 1947 hurricane, and, more importantly, they would allow for continued
urbanization of this very hazardous region. Alarmingly, protection of existing development
accounted for only 21 percent of the benefits needed to justify the project, while 79 percent were
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to come from new development that would now be feasible with the added protection provided
by the improved levee system.133
As a result, development in to the floodplain was rapid, and compounded by the
extraordinary damage that ironically devastated the region within the levee system during
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Federal policy has had a heavy-handed effect on facilitating and
sustaining development in hazardous areas. A paradox exists that by trying to make the most
hazardous parts of New Orleans safe for urban expansion, local leaders and entrepreneurs had
the unintended effect of directly contributing to the devastation brought by Hurricane Katrina,
since it increased the amount of development possible in low-lying, flood-prone areas. Some
residents and researchers even suggest that by providing levee protection and new drainage
works to that area of suburban growth, the Army Corps and city diverted resources that could
have been used to improve drainage, pumping capacity, and levees in older areas of the city.134
Similar paradoxes existed in development practices in the incorporation of the city of Central,
since much of the town’s developed area previously had remained undeveloped, open space.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, flood losses
increased fourfold in the United States between 2012 and 2013. Monetary losses totaled $2.15
billion.135 Due to changes in climate, increases in the occurrence and intensity of heavy rainfall
events will likely exacerbate the negative effects of flooding among most inland regions of the
United States.136 More frequent storms and their related hazards pose an even greater threat to
many coastal communities. In addition, hurricanes and tropical storms have been moving slower,
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often stalling over inland areas and dumping huge amounts of rain on locales that are not
equipped to deal with such a violent deluge. This has occurred several times in recent years,
notably in Houston during Hurricanes Harvey (2017) and Imelda (2019), and the unnamed rain
system responsible for the 2016 floods in Louisiana.137 Many communities along U.S. coastlines
have begun to take heed and have slowed development in coastal flood zones, but inland
communities are also at risk – and in some, development in flood zones is increasing.138 Qiang et
al. found that while new urban development in flood zones near coasts has generally declined,
but that it has grown in inland counties.139 This is worrisome, in that it implies that people who
have experienced flooding on the coast migrate inland, but may not realize that they are still
vulnerable if they relocate to an inland flood zone. Some of the worst damage from hurricanes
along the East Coast in the past several decades has come from inland flooding along rivers after
storms move ashore. Severe weather evacuation often directs residents to seek shelter inland, but
river flooding can put them at risk if there are not enough shelters and accommodations in safe
locations. Additionally, inland communities may not take adequate measures to ensure the safety
of their residents. Coastal communities are better versed in adaptation and mitigation techniques
related to tropical weather. Hurricane Floyd in 1999 showed that tropical weather events could
wreak havoc inland, mainly through river flooding. Floyd moved onshore near Cape Fear, North
Carolina in mid-September with wind speeds of about 105 miles per hour and traveled
northward, dumping up to 20 inches of rain along a path stretching into New England and
Canada. The amount of rainfall overwhelmed most of the rivers in the eastern part of North
Carolina. Floyd’s impact was particularly devastating because it quickly followed Hurricane
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Dennis and inundated already heavily saturated soil.140 While the effects of Hurricane Floyd
gave rise to the idea that inland flooding had the potential to be as problematic as issues on the
coast, not much has been done since then to mitigate potential impacts, as was seen in the
destruction caused recently by Hurricane Florence (2018).
Inland migration became a prominent reality for Baton Rouge following Hurricane
Katrina, when there was a 20 percent population decline in New Orleans and surrounding
parishes.141 This demographic change came as a result of slow recovery after the storm and from
people not wanting to return to a changing coastline. A changing coastline can put major stress
on both the communities that are being lost and on those that are morphing into their role as
emerging coastal areas, and must be given the proper resources to be able to succeed in leading
the way in a more fluid policy arena. The 2017 Coastal Master Plan identifies projects designed
to maintain and build land, reduce flood risk, and provide habitats to support different
ecosystems.142 The Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) is committed to
implementing successful policy tools by working directly with state and local agencies, the
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, the Department of Natural
Resources, the Office of Community Development and the State Hazard Mitigation Plan.143
Baton Rouge and its surrounding parishes are particularly vulnerable to floods. As discussed
previously, a large flood in 1983 caused some US$344 million in damages in the Amite Basin.144
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For Central, a perceived potential for flood risk reduction comes from the Comite River
Diversion Canal. Developers have intensively built up areas along the Comite and Amite rivers
and in the territory where the two rivers converge and back up into Bayou Manchac during
floods. Meanwhile, the Comite River Diversion Canal, which would address flooding risk by
channeling water from Louisiana's Comite River away from the Amite River and into the
Mississippi River, has received irregular and inadequate funding and is years from becoming
operational.145

Figure 3.1. Comite River Diversion Canal Project. Source: Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development. Accessed on 25 September 2019 146
The project will consist of a 12-mile long diversion channel from the Comite River to the
Mississippi River, a diversion structure at the Comite River, guide levees, the Lilly Bayou
control structure, four drop structures at the intersections of the diversion channel with McHugh
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Road, Bayou Baton Rouge, Cypress Bayou, and White Bayou, and Highway and Railroad
Bridges. Low-flow augmentation pumps at the intercepted streams and an earthen closure at
Brooks Lake, clearing and snagging of Bayou Baton Rouge, White Bayou and Cypress Bayou
north of the diversion channel will reduce flooding in those areas.147 In addition to the direct
reduction of impact of flood stage in the main impact areas, it is thought that the Comite
Diversion Canal will also benefit emergency planning and response mechanisms by lowering
flood levels that can inundate roads. When completed, the 12-mile canal would redirect high
water from the Comite River toward the Mississippi River, passing between Baker and Zachary,
to the west of Central. As of late 2018, engineers in charge of the project hoped to have that the
project ready for use by the 2021 hurricane season – a highly aggressive timetable, given the
current state of affairs. P.J. Varnado, the project leader from the Army Corps of Engineers has
stated that the main challenge facing construction comes from the need to relocate utility lines in
the area.148 The state and the Corps must coordinate with electric companies, railroads, and the
oil and gas industry to move electric and rail lines, and pipelines out of the canal’s path. Official
groundbreaking for the project’s renewal commenced in April of 2019, with several state
officials present, following decades of planning.149
A second highly touted and equally controversial solution to EBR parish’s flooding woes
comes in the form of the proposed Darlington Reservoir project. At the same time the Comite
Diversion Canal Project started to gain traction, the Corps of Engineers began studying on the
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potential benefits of a reservoir on the East Feliciana-St. Helena Parish line proposed by the
Louisiana DOT.150 Following the conclusion of the DOTD study in 1989, the U.S. Army Corps
completed studies in 1992 and 1997; the first study found insufficient benefits, but following the
latter study, the Army Corps did in fact re-evaluate and find benefits; however they were unable
to secure state and local sponsorship funds.151 The project was contentious since it would dam
the Amite River and intentionally flood sparsely populated land in East Feliciana and St. Helena
parishes. While calls for the reservoir’s construction have remained dormant for some time, there
was a resurgence following the 2016 floods, especially by residents calling for a re-evaluation of
the cost-benefit analysis performed by the Army Corps152; however in December of 2019, the St.
Helena Parish Police Jury voted against this proposed revival.153
Historically, flood protection has seen a number of development steps depending on the
type of flood: a flash flood obviously requires different responses than a flood which regularly
inundates the lower part of river basin. Flash floods have high velocities and high erosive forces,
and only extremely solid structures can withstand such force. The main solution for escaping a
flash flood used to be to get out of harm’s way by moving houses and other belongings to
grounds which are so high that no floods can reach them. But in the floodplains of large rivers,
velocities are lower and the main danger is from the wide extent of inundated areas, as has been
seen across the U.S. in recent years.154 Prior to the passage of flood-related policies people
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responded to such floods in a variety of ways; (1) by moving the location of their cities and
villages out of reach of the highest flood which they experienced, or of which they had clear
indications, such as deposits on old river banks along the flood plain, (2) by self-insuring by
building structures expected to endure regular damage, or (3) to elevate structures above
common risk. Now, we often rely on floodplain maps to determine where to find suitable places
to build and develop. Prior to the 2016 flood the people of Central largely subscribed to the
notion that “we haven’t flooded before, we don’t live close to the river, so there is no way that it
can happen to me.”155
Localized flooding tends to be spatially repetitive over time, and local decision makers
have an opportunity to learn from previous events and make proactive policy adjustments to
reduce the adverse effects of a subsequent storm. Despite the importance of understanding the
degree to which local jurisdictions learn from flood risks and under what circumstances,
preventable flooding damage is still rampant, especially when it comes to questions of public
safety versus economic development. The basic concept of safe development is that land exposed
to natural hazards can be used for development if steps are taken to make it safe for human
occupancy.156 The means of achieving this have evolved over time, but they basically include
measures to mitigate the likelihood of damage and measures to deal with any potential financial
risk. Such mitigation can come from the construction of physical barriers to lessen the impact of
hazards or by enacting policies that encourage citizens to lower their own vulnerability to
hazards. When governments do not take these precautions they are participating in strictly
economic development, which can lower a community’s resilience. An issue that exists in this
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situation is that while local citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in
disasters, local officials pay insufficient attention to policies to limit exposure.157 It is not
uncommon for cities that are experiencing rapid development and expanding suburbs, such as the
development of Baton Rouge into the Central area, to prioritize development over issues of
safety (in this case, in the form of environmental hazards). In a conversation with Congressman
Garret Graves following the flood, he stated that development occurred fast in Baton Rouge,
while resilience and floodplain management had not.158
One of the main ways to involve communities in safe development practices is earn local
property owners discounts on flood insurance through the NFIP’s Community Rating System.
The FEMA Community Rating System (CRS) is a voluntary incentive program that recognizes
and encourages community floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP
requirements.159 Residents can attain lower flood insurance premium rates by achieving certain
goals that exceed the base level NIFP requirements. Many communities, especially those with
severe flood hazards, high rates of growth, or a history of repeated flooding, are aware of the
wide range of actions they can take to reduce flood risk in addition to participating in the NFIP.
These actions keep their citizens safer, minimize property damage, build resiliency, and foster a
better quality of life within the community. Participating in the CRS enables communities to earn
insurance premium reductions for their residents for activities already being implemented by a
community. Authors of a 2016 study evaluated how flood mitigation, risk, and location choice
affected the CRS’s success. They analyze how different socioeconomic factors affect community
member’s perception of risk and the program as a whole. Fan et al. assert that college graduates
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value the CRS program at higher levels than those without a college degree. Individuals born in
high-risk regions also tend to place higher value on community-level flood mitigation activities.
Using the two-stage sorting model, they find that individuals value overall community safety due
to flood mitigation activities and potential savings from reduced flood insurance premium, which
are reflected by the CRS credit points earned by the community. Generally, individuals place the
greatest value on activities related to the public information about flood risks. In a similar but
more dated study, Viscusi and Zeckhauser suggest that people who perceive themselves at
greater risk tend to be more supportive of public assistance and that policy preferences reflect
self-interest.160 It is unsurprising that people are more apt to take action when an act has a higher
chance of affecting them adversely and directly. East Baton Rouge Parish has the second most
CRS points when compared to other Louisiana parishes at 2,063 and receives a $2,984,739 CRS
total discount.161 Interestingly, Louisiana as whole receives more credits on average than the rest
of the country for drainage maintenance costs, but ranks far below the rest of the country for
levee safety.
Forty-two percent of East Baton Rouge Parish, 70 percent of Ascension Parish, and 75
percent of Livingston Parish are in 100-year floodplains.162 Seventy percent of Central lies in the
floodplain. As a result, the city has made an effort throughout its existence to help residents
mitigate preventable risks. The City of Central is a participant in the National Flood Insurance
Program and the Community Rating System. Following incorporation, the FEMA amended flood
maps for the city in 2008. The special flood hazard area added many neighborhoods within the
new town boundaries that were not previously in the flood zone, driving up the cost of insurance
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a great deal for longtime residents of the area who did not support the change.163 A long-fought
battle ensued, concluding in July 2016.164 A Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) and the LSU
AgCenter flood map reassigned many homeowners in the Central community to flood zone “X,”
which indicated that they were in a no-flood zone. In some cases, residents also dropped from
flood zone “A” to flood zone “AE,” which lowered their yearly flood insurance premiums.165
This was celebrated at its inception, but just a few short weeks later the area was hit with
catastrophic levels of rain which led to disastrous flooding. Many of the people who suffered
some of the worst flood damage were people that had recently dropped their flood insurance.166
To assist homeowners that live in flood-prone areas, FEMA puts out Flood Insurance
Rate Maps (FIRMs), which delimit areas of high, moderate and low flood risk, broken down into
different zones.167 While the intended purpose of FIRMs is to show special flood hazard areas
(SFHAs) and provide basic information for town planning and insurance purposes, the methods
of determining these zones can leave something to be desired. For instance, accurate flood
inundation mapping must contend with uncertainties when determining the SFHA’s and a
relatively short record of information. Additionally, they are not always accurate in portraying
information that is useful for non-insurance flood hazard mitigation purposes. FIRMs need to be
accessible to local users and do a better job of mapping actual risks. In the United States, and
especially in Louisiana, exposure is acute in that a combination of subsidized flood insurance
and homeowner tax incentives has encouraged development into risky areas in floodplains and
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coastal zones.168 This necessitates that FIRM’s be readily available to the public and be able to
accurately portray flood risk. While FIRMS do exist online, not all those who live in flood zones
are well informed on how to interpret them or even know to consult them.169 While FIRM’s are
meant to reflect historical precipitation in order to project future risk, in recent years
uncertainties have played a bigger role. Critical to the events of 2016 were stream flow backup
and abnormal rainfall levels, things that would not show up in a traditional FIRM.170 As
mentioned previously, many houses that flooded were not in designated flood zones, meaning
the owners were exempt from flood insurance requirements. Furthermore, because of the high
premiums, many residents who lived in those areas did not elect to purchase what they viewed as
an unnecessary expensive. However, in the aftermath of the 2016 flood events, local residents’
opinion about the need for map revisions appears to be mixed. My review of current FIRMs for
Central indicates few amendments. FEMA claims that the flood-producing rain was so
unprecedented that it did not mandate a re-examination.171
3.3. The Flood of 2016
In the early hours of August 11th a rain system flared up in southern Louisiana. It
remained mostly stationary, resulting in torrential downpours in Baton Rouge, Lafayette, and
surrounding areas. The National Weather Service reported rainfall rates of up to 3 inches an hour
with totals surpassing 2 feet in some of the worst affected areas. Peak accumulation was almost
32 inches in Watson, Louisiana, immediately to the northeast of Central. In Central itself, peak
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rainfall reached just less than 2 feet at 23.4 inches.172 Rain and inclement weather are not
uncommon for south Louisiana in the summer, especially August which usually marks the peak
of hurricane season; the lack of association with a named tropical weather system gave the public
less time to implement emergency preparation since many believed there was no reason to
worry.
A rapid attribution study published in early 2017 suggested that the intensity of the storm
may be related to anthropogenic climate change. Due to the prompt publication of the study
after the storm, the authors state they purposefully focused their assessment on one aspect of the
flooding problem: the risk of extreme precipitation events that have the potential to produce
inland flooding.173 Analyses point towards the tendency for more and perhaps stronger upperlevel troughs propagating out of the western U.S. in the summer; these have an increasing
potential to cross paths with low-pressure systems that form around the Gulf Coast. Combined
with the projected increase in atmospheric moisture, they projected that precipitation magnitudes
would increase. Large-ensemble modeling indicates that Louisiana will face the prospect of
future tropical-midlatitude interactions in the future.174
Historic freshwater flooding in the region encompassing Baton Rouge followed the
extreme precipitation event. Provisional reports based on the USGS stream gauges from 18
August 2016 reported that thirty sites in the region registered above flood stage levels (levels at
which overflow of natural banks starts to cause damage in the local area), and that floodwaters
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overtopped 50 of the 261 recording sites in Louisiana.175 This complex event prompted rivers to
respond to local precipitation as well as upstream and downstream conditions. The backwater
flooding (upstream flooding caused by high stages downstream that impeded movement from the
tributaries into the main channel176) of the Amite and Comite rivers played a huge role in the
flood damages, especially in Central, which lies between the two rivers. The flood event caused
not just the Amite and Comite Rivers to rise, but also triggered the rapid rise of many of the
other streams, creeks, canals and culverts that drain the area as well. The Amite River crested at
nearly 5 ft. (1.5 m) above the previous record in Denham Springs and the southeastern part of
Central. In nearby Ascension Parish floodwaters overtopped a levee along the Amite River and
damaged nearly one-third of all structures.177 Particularly notable smaller tributaries that incurred
much flooding include Blackwater Bayou178 and the culverts along Hooper Road.179 With the
main river channels in Central backed up with rainfall and these other tributaries swollen as well,
water had nowhere to go but into the surrounding neighborhoods (the very neighborhoods that
generally rely on those smaller tributaries for adequate drainage).
3.4. Recovery and Community Perceptions
This section analyzes interview responses that I collected. Interview respondents ranged
in age from early 30s to 75. Respondents had almost universally lived in Central for at least the
last 15 years with several buying homes in the 1970s. Several respondents were residents of the
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area during the 1983 flood and none of them flooded during the earlier event. Of ten people
interviewed, no respondents had experienced flooding in their homes prior to 2016, even if they
resided in the floodplain. Of those interviewed six had homes that are/were in the floodplain, and
all of them flooded. In addition to those not in the floodplain, two respondents did not live in an
area of special flood hazard and still experienced at least 3 feet of water in their homes. Of those
interviewed, two did not flood, but had close ties to immediate family members (siblings or
parents) that flooded and resided with them during the recovery process. Of those surveyed all
owned homes in Central. Occupations were widespread with a mix of public servants, teachers,
and general residents of Central interviewed. Level of education varied from high school to post
graduate.
Before moving forward to interview analysis, it is necessary to have an understanding as
to how Restore Louisiana, a task force set up through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to help ease recovery efforts fits in to the flood recovery process. HUD’s
Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program provides funding for the
Restore Louisiana Homeowner Assistance Program (RLHP), which was appropriated by
Congress in Section 145 of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017, Section 192 of the Further
Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2017.180 The grants are therefore authorized under Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (HCDA) for necessary expenses related to disaster relief,
long-term recovery, restoration of infrastructure and housing, and economic revitalization in the
most impacted and distressed areas resulting from a major disaster.
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The first step in the program’s procedures is the initial survey. Homeowners may register
for an account and take the survey online. Homeowners without internet access may register and
take the survey over the phone, a critical point because many of those interviewed were over the
age of 70 and several had aversions to the internet, preferring to deal with federal agencies over
the phone or in person. After the survey, RLHP conducts an environmental review on each
property.181 Survey respondents who own a single-family home or manufactured housing unit
(MHU) that is located outside of the floodway and has no other environmental condition
preventing the program from expending funds to repair or reconstruct the home, or replace the
MHU, are then queued up for the application process. Survey respondents become “applicants”
once they are invited to apply for program assistance. Based on the phase of the program for
which an applicant would potentially qualify, Restore issued application invitations following the
2016 flood events. As of December 30, 2017, all survey respondents who had a completed
environmental review that did not prevent the expenditure of program funds, had been invited to
apply. As individuals continued to submit survey responses, the program proceeded to conduct
environmental reviews and invite additional applications based on the results of the
environmental review. The Program initially set a survey response deadline of July 20, 2018, and
an application deadline of October 1, 2018.182 On September 24, 2018, the survey was reopened, and the application deadline was extended in response to the announcement of a
potential change to the Small Business Administration (SBA) duplication of benefits policy.183
On August 12th when the rain started to fall, Dennis Keen did not know that the storm
was any different than a typical rainfall event. By the second day of nearly continuous rain, he
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and his wife Patsy made the decision to evacuate as the water had risen higher than either of
them had seen it since purchasing their home in Central (then Baton Rouge) in 1978.184 Down
the road near Central High School, Victoria Greene left town for the weekend, feeling uneasy
about the rain but it never crossed her mind that her or her parents’ house (directly across the
street) would flood. Her parents would get 6 feet of water, while her house would be spared.
Further to the east on the banks of the Amite River, Laci Lemoine and her husband battled with
evacuating with their 3-month old daughter and two cats. They eventually made the decision to
evacuate and ended up trapped on the Holden overpass on I-10 for 9 hours before being
evacuated by military vehicles. And in the Central municipal offices, freshly appointed
Floodplain Administrator Kathi Cowen had no idea at the time that she would spend the
foreseeable future trying to piece this tight-knit community back together.
These are just some of the sentiments expressed about individual experiences during the
flood. Upon evaluating conversations, several key themes emerged. Most common was the
intense distrust and unhappiness with FEMA both in its inability to assist during the rain event
and in the difficulty with flood insurance from the NFIP in the aftermath. In addition to
discontent with FEMA, there was also a fair bit of animosity towards Restore Louisiana.
People’s relationship to Restore Louisiana’s involvement in the recovery process was of great
interest to me. Three of the people I spoke with, married couple Dennis and Patsy and Central
resident Vickie, have had the most trouble dealing with Restore and as of September 2019 had
still not received their full payments. Both parties had flood insurance and neither had flooded
previously. Prior flood claims or receipt of Restore Louisiana money previously, made residents
ineligible for money following the 2016 floods. Since most people in Central had not flooded in
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the past, many people in town were automatically eligible. While many people struggled with
Restore, I believe these three interviewees faced particular difficulty because of their inability to
deal with many of the necessary steps online. Laci Lemoine, a 32 year old teacher who also
received federal assistance money raised this point during her interview; that people who
struggled the most were the ones who were unable to deftly handle the federal bureaucracy.
Mrs. Lemoine and her husband were an interesting case in that they owned two homes at
the time of the flood. The young family had just had a baby and was preparing to move into a
bigger home. The couple had just closed on their new home prior to the flooding event and was
in the process of getting their old home ready for market when disaster struck. Of the events that
transpired just prior to the flood Mrs. Lemoine states, “We were eager to buy a bigger home and
one finally came up in a super coveted neighborhood that we had been eyeing forever and we
really felt we had to jump on it immediately, even though we hadn’t sold our current home. We
talked to the bank and we somehow got cleared to pay two mortgages, and they let us buy the
house and it was this big risk we felt we had to take. And then literally the day after we signed
the papers on the new house, both houses flooded.”185
Despite their gross misfortune, Mrs. Lemoine and her family were able not only to move
into their new house, but also get the old house back on the market in four months. She
remembers the permit process being arduous and complicated, asserting that it was her comfort
level and persistence in dealing with government bureaucracy which allowed her to navigate the
system successfully. She remembers that several of the forms, steps, and inquiries that other
flood victims were spending hours waiting to talk to people about were available on their
website, eliminating much of the wait time and allowing their recovery process to progress
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faster. This was also the case for Vitoria Greene, another young Central High School teacher
interviewed. While Mrs. Greene’s home did not flood, her parents, who lived directly across the
street took on almost 6 feet of water.186 Mrs. Greene and her sister assisted not only their parents
but also many of their older (65 years and older) neighbors in navigating the FEMA website,
allowing their community to rebuild much faster than several of the homes in the immediate
surrounding area.
Age and comfort level with technology played a large part in people’s negative
perceptions of federal aid, but every person I interviewed had generally positive views of the
attempts made by local policy makers to assist residents, especially during the flood. Opinions
were skewed on the aftermath, but relative discontent was made obvious during the election later
that year when the entire city council and mayor were voted out of office.187 Wayne Messina,
one of the ousted city council members, claims that it was an underappreciation of the scale of
positive work being done behind the scenes that led to the vote. He asserts that then-Mayor
Junior Davis was a phenomenal advocate in Washington, D.C. for getting federal relief money
sent to the parish and city. He and many others had high praise for Congressman Garret Graves
as well. According to Mr. Messina, Davis and Representative Graves were able to drum up
support for federal programs in Washington that would not have been utilized had they not been
staunch advocates. Of course, happenings in D.C. were far removed from the immediate
destruction that was unfolding in Central itself.
Kathi Cowen, floodplain administrator, had been in her position just a few months when
the floods occurred. Not only did she and her staff battle lines of hundreds of people every day in
186

Victoria Greene, interview by author, Central, October 1, 2019.
Terry Jones. “Central Voters Clean House.” The Advocate, November 8, 2017. Accessed at:
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/communities/article_98bcfd94-e2c3-11e8-87784f23183058a5.html
187

63

the immediate aftermath, but the municipal building flooded as well, destroying all the
computers, which had been on the floor of the building, un-elevated. City workers were forced to
set up temporary headquarters outside the building every day to issue permits and assist with
flood losses. In addition, since this was the first time the city had ever had someone in the
Floodplain Manager role, and there were not procedures in place to follow; staff was largely
coming up with a method as they went along.188 Despite this, Cowen maintains that people were
more than understanding, despite some having lost everything. She states, “These people, they
had lost so much, but I think because we had faces, we were members of their community, and
we had also lost the same things, they were willing to give us the benefit of the doubt. Unlike
with FEMA, where it was this faceless entity which was supposed to be helping us but wasn’t
[not right in the aftermath at least].”189 I believe this comes from the assumption that since
FEMA’s main purpose is to deal with emergency management and disaster relief, people felt
they should have been better prepared to deal with it. On the other hand, residents were
witnessing local policymakers and officials go through great lengths to assist them, so were more
partial to the help being provided there.
To touch more on local response, it is clear that while community members were able to
come together to help one another, several administrative things have room for improvement.
Louisiana State Police Officer Sergeant Michelle King recounts her experience as an off duty
officer at the time of the floods. “I got calls from my niece and my son early in the morning on
the second day of rain. My niece was nursing her newborn and was panicking because all the
breastmilk she had frozen was going bad because of the power outage. Her husband was out of
town, and she waited for a long time for help to arrive because the water had risen to waist deep
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in the span of an hour. My son Drew (husband to Laci Lemoine, quoted earlier) and his family
were stuck on the overpass and my only thoughts were to get to my family. I live in Walker, so it
wasn’t as bad there but as I got in my unit and started driving I realized I had to jump in, to help
as many people as I could. I barely remember the next 12 hours; they were a daze.” Sergeant
King stopped and helped private boat owners evacuate people for several hours before she finally
flagged down a military vehicle that was looking for an assignment; she was the one that sent the
vehicle to the Holden overpass to rescue her son and daughter-in-law.
Off-duty public service personnel performed a majority of rescues in the first 12 hours of
the flood event.190 Sergeant King relayed in her interview that the operations centers of both East
Baton Rouge and Livingston parishes were on the ground floor of their respective buildings,
causing them to take on water and lose power almost immediately, effectively cutting off
civilians from being able to call for help. Since 2016, both centers have been moved to upper
floors in their respective buildings.191 Sergeant King asserts that the way mostly off-duty police
officers were able to come together speaks volumes to the community of Central and mindsets in
southern Louisiana as a whole. Sergeant King was also on the ground in New Orleans in 2005 as
an emergency responder during Hurricane Katrina and remarked that, despite the gaps that came
to light in the recovery process, emergency response as a whole was much better than in New
Orleans.
A final common theme that existed among those interviewed was an intense attachment
to place. Of all those interviewed, only one party indicated that they would even consider leaving
the area if another similar storm were to come through. From those who had lost multiple homes
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in 2016, to those who had experienced flooding before, to those who had never before flooded, a
clear attachment to Central was clear. Victoria Greene commented, “There are many reasons that
I could leave Central [and Louisiana]. Even though I’ve been lucky to have gone to college and
travel around the world this has always been home. As I’ve gotten older, I’ve become much
more liberal and an advocate for the environment, things that are not always compatible with the
beliefs of my neighbors. My husband and I have considered countless times, picking up and
moving to Seattle, but we always come to same conclusion; it would never be home in the same
way that Central is.”192 Casey Burnett, an employee at LSU has lived in the Central area since
the 1980s, moving in just before the 1983 floods. Her daughter was just elected to the Central
City Council and her other three children and their families all live in town. She has been an
active member of the community in Central since she settled there. She stated, “If I’m meant to
go in a flood that’s how I’ll go, in my home in the same town as my babies.”193 Dennis and
Patsy, who are still waiting to finish their home and on the Restore Louisiana money, were the
only respondents who showed an inkling of discontent. They mused, “If our kids weren’t so
attached, I would move in a heartbeat. But home is where the grandkids are and we aren’t
leaving. Maybe when they get to high school.”194 When asked what their tipping points would
be, or what it would take to consider leaving, most reiterated the importance of family. “If all of
them go I would happily follow,” stated Vickie Fellows. Mrs. Fellows has moved 4 times in the
last 20 years; not necessarily for flood-related reasons but has made great effort not to live in the
floodplain, quite the feat in Central, of which almost 70 percent of land area lies in a special
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flood hazard zone.195 Others, like Wayne Messina remain staunchly loyal to the town, “Not me,
I’ll never leave. My brother just moved to Shreveport and my kids live in Dallas. The floods can
try and take me, but this is where I am meant to be.”196
Community perceptions when it comes to flood loss are integral to the recovery process.
Interviews with a collection of different people, with different backgrounds and points of view
are vessels to gaining knowledge that can be transferred into sustainable action. The best way to
increase a community’s resilience to natural hazards is to give them power in the decision
making process.197 Central has a history that extends back past its incorporation, a whole bevy of
prior actions and precedents that are in place to influence the future. It can be difficult to enact
change in places that have such a commitment to tradition and history, but by incorporating the
ideas and desires of the people that live there, that make Central the town it is, the city has a
chance to grow and to truly prepare itself to better deal with similar problems in the future.
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CHAPTER 4. GOVERNMENT POLICY: CENTRAL AND BEYOND

This chapter focuses on the evolution of government policies in Central and how they
advance either economic or safe development practices. There are several instances in the
development of the city of Central when officials prioritized economic development over
community safety. However, it is also important to note that there are also many instances where
the line between safe and economic development is blurred, particularly in cases where safe
development may lead to negative economic consequences. I will also discuss policies and
ordinances from neighboring Ascension and Livingston parishes to compare and contrast the
orientation of policies in different settings. Policies in the neighboring parishes overall have
defined floodplains and provided a mechanism and path to implement safe development
practices more consistently at the local level.
Prior to its incorporation in 2005, Central had experienced significant residential,
commercial, and population growth.198 East Baton Rouge Parish ordinances and codes guided
this development, especially actions taken following the 1983 flood, which adversely effected
what is now Central (but was then a part of the city of Baton Rouge). From a thorough review of
existing ordinances in Central and East Baton Rouge Parish from 1983 to the present, it is clear
that policies that attempt to mitigate development into flood hazard areas existed, but they were
vague – in other words, they do not clearly institute/call for safe development practices.. Parish
ordinances did not always prescribe how the flood zone was meant to be developed and gaps in
enforcement mechanisms made concrete change difficult.199 The lack of precision greatly
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inhibits the ability of local government to step in and hold commercial and private developers
responsible for plans to put in new businesses and residences in high risk areas.
4.1. Review of Ordinances – Early Policies in East Baton Rouge Parish
In order to evaluate safe v. economic development, I classified flood related policies based on
the definition provided in Chapter 1.: (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Safe Development vs. Economic Development in the Floodplain: Timeline of Select
Policies of the Capital Region
Safe Development
Controlling the alterations of natural floodplains, streams, channels and wetlands,
regulating flood barriers that would unnaturally divert flood waters in potentially
hazardous ways and urged policy makers to control filling, grading, dredging and

Economic Development
Flood Zone Determination form must be acquired for those willing to construct homes in flood
prone areas of the parish. The code provides no indication of the definition of flood prone
areas.

other such development activities
EBR Ord. #7017 art. 2, sec. 1. (1951)
Ascension Parish Ord. #9.50 sec. D, art. 1. (1998)
Building official would determine if there was a flood hazard present and if there was, ensuing
Delegated the responsibility of local government units to adopt regulations to
minimize flood losses and set several standards for areas of shallow flooding,

construction to anchor structures to prevent flotation, use flood-resistant construction
materials/building methods, and build proposed structures that fall in the flood zone with

recognized as areas with FEMA designation AO and AH zones
their lowest floor elevated to at least the base flood elevation.
Ascension Parish Ord. #Sec 9.50 sec. A, art. 1. (2002)
EBR Ord. # 13362 sec. 8, art. 3. (2001)
if a flood hazard exists, the floodplain administrator must notify the permit applicant that any
Mandated that any new construction be at least 2 feet above the BFE and

proposed new construction or substantial improvement should follow several criteria; using

additionally mandated that a certified architect or engineer submit a certificate

flood resistant construction materials, anchoring foundations to prevent floatation,

corroborating this to the floodplain administrator

maintaining accurate drainage, and ensuring that all new and updated structures are in line

Ascension Parish Ord. #Sec 9.50 sec. A, art. 3. (2002)

with base flood elevation requirements outlined by FEMA
Central Ord. sec. 8, art. 3. (2009)
when a regulatory floodway has not been designated, the floodplain administrator must

If downstream channel improvements are included as part of the proposed

require that no new construction, substantial improvements, or other development (including

development or landfill, engineering calculations shall be made to show that the

fill) shall be permitted within Zones A1-30 and AE on the FIRM, unless it is demonstrated that

adverse effects of increased runoff from 100-year storm event due to the proposed

the cumulative effect of the proposed development, when combined with all other existing

development is offset by the beneficial effects of the proposed channel

and anticipated development, will not increase the water surface elevation of the

improvements.

base flood more than one foot at any point within the City of Central.  Cumulative effect not

Central Ord. sec. 3, art. 7. (2016)

defined.
Central Ord. sec. 8, art. 3 (2009)
Amite River Basin Commission prepares floodplain management plan for the whole Amite Basin

Limits fill, restriction to 3 feet.
but is not granted any regulatory authority
Ascension Parish Ord. #2019 – 08 sec. A, art. 1 (2019)
ARBC Floodplain Management Plan (2015)
Buyout of Silverleaf Street in Ascension Parish to return land to wetland

Parish Council waives permit requirements for placing manufactured homes on front

Ascension Parish Council Minutes (2019)

properties in wake of 2016 flood event.
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East Baton Rouge Parish Council Minutes (2016)

Source: East Baton Rouge, Ascension, Livingston Parish Ordinances; City of Central
My analysis of flood-related policies in East Baton Rouge Parish begins before 1983, the last
time East Baton Rouge Parish experienced catastrophic flooding, prior to 2016. Policies before
1983 are few and far between. A 1951 amendment to a development clause in the City Code
requires builders to acquire a Flood Zone Determination form for houses in flood-prone areas of
the parish. The code provides no indication of the definition of flood-prone areas.200 Policies like
this that mask economic interests with vague mentions of safety, are common in the expansion of
East Baton Rouge Parish, limiting the actual scope of safe development. The other important
EBR Parish foundational policy in Section 8.3 specifies the requirements in the event of flood
hazard. The parish council passed this act in 2001 and last amended it in 2012.201 The ordinance
first specified that a parish building official would determine if there was a flood hazard present
and if there was, ensuing construction should anchor structures to prevent flotation, use floodresistant construction materials and building methods, and build any proposed structures within
the flood zone with their lowest floor elevated to at least the base flood elevation, as per
delimited by the FIRM, following safe development principles.202 The parish adopted FEMA’s
definition of flood hazard areas, included in “The Flood Insurance Study for East Baton Rouge
Parish, Baton Rouge & Vicinity.”203 The report states that the base flood elevation (BFE) is the
minimum height at which construction can take place. The problem in this situation is that there
is no requirement to build above the BFE. While it is better to build at the BFE than below it, a
policy that adheres to safe development principles would require that homes be built above the
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BFE level. Not requiring this margin of safety prioritized development and accommodated the
influx of subdivisions built in Central leading up to the events of 2016.204
While new flood mitigation policies in EBR Parish largely dwindled after the early
2000s, neighboring Ascension and Livingston parishes were more active in passing policies that
adhered to safe development principles before 2016. In response to the 1983 floods, Ascension
Parish passed an ordinance in 1998 that focused explicitly on methods to reduce flood losses in
densely settled areas. The policy lays out different ways to limit flood loss, focusing restricting
development into the floodplain, in line with what a sustainable safe development practice
should do. Most importantly it called for controlling the alterations of natural floodplains,
streams, channels and wetlands, regulating flood barriers that would unnaturally divert flood
waters in potentially hazardous ways, and urged policy makers to control filling, grading,
dredging and other such development activities.205 Ironically, the failure to heed these
requirements contributed to the devastating flood damage in 2016. This amendment has not been
modified or effectively enforced since its passage, nullifying its safety provisions and goals. For
a policy tool to be effective it must be adaptable and evolve along with changing levels of risk
and land uses, otherwise it may contribute to unsustainable economic development. It also must
maintain viable enforcement that imposes costs, such as a fine, on developers who violate the
code. Additional steps towards positive change came in 2002 with the resolution that stated that
amelioration of certain flood damage effects could be achieved through a comprehensive basinwide floodplain management approach, prompting the Amite River Basin Commission to
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prepare a flood hazard mitigation plan for the basin.206 The parish council resolved to support the
tenets of such a plan, with the hope being that the proposed plan would be the first steps towards
an effective basin-wide management scheme. While the Ascension Parish council was supportive
of this plan from its inception, it took several years for the East Baton Rouge Parish council to
follow suit.207 It also delegated the responsibility to adopt regulations to minimize flood losses
and set several standards for areas of shallow flooding (FEMA’s AO and AH zones) to local
units of government.208 The parish’s ordinances also mandated that any new construction be at
least 2 feet above the BFE and additionally mandated that a certified architect or engineer submit
a certificate corroborating this to the floodplain administrator.209 These amendments to
Ascension Parish’s existing policies are a clear cut example that it is possible to implement safe
development practices, even in a place where policies that promote economic development
already exist. It should be noted however, that Ascension Parish’s population has grown much
faster than that of East Baton Rouge Parish, allowing quick, unsafe development to occur.210 I
would argue that the difference is that Ascension Parish is less densely populated, making the
increased population less of a problem (despite also occupying a high risk area, like Central).
Ascension Parish has been able to succeed where East Baton Rouge has not because of its ability
to successfully implement safe development oriented policy tools.
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4.2. Review of Ordinances – Policies in Central
Several policies exist in the Central Code of Ordinances that directly address potential
flood issues and appear to promote safe development. One of the most prominent is in Section
8.3, which clearly states that before a builder can receive a permit, the floodplain administrator
will determine whether or not the proposed building site is reasonably safe from flooding. It
further asserts that if a flood hazard exists, the floodplain administrator must notify the permit
applicant that any proposed new construction or substantial improvement should follow several
criteria use of flood resistant construction materials, anchor foundations to prevent floatation,
maintain proper drainage, and ensure that all new and updated structures align with FEMA’s
base flood elevation requirements.211 On the surface, policies in this vein appear to be safe
development, but I fear that they can in fact lead to the phenomenon that Burby discusses
wherein policies that promote “safe” development often prompt an influx of people to move in,
making any damage that happens down the line that much worse. For example, the parish
council enacted this ordinance in 2005 and updated it in 2008, 2009 and 2012. However, during
that span, Central’s population grew from 19,000 to just under 29,000 residents, bringing new
commercial and residential development, including the construction of several new subdivisions
in the 100-year floodplain, in high risk flood zones.212 Economic development clearly superseded
the safe development policies as Central’s population rose. The municipal council has not made
changes to this ordinance since the 2016 floods, when many of those businesses and homes
flooded.
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Section 8.3 contains several critically important policies including one that lays out
actions expected of the acting floodplain administrator to stymie floodplain development.213
Actions include reviewing permit applications to determine whether proposed building site
projects, including the placement of manufactured homes, will be reasonably safe from flooding,
reviewing applications for proposed large developments, making necessary interpretations when
a question arises pertaining to the definition of a special flood hazard zone and ensuring
floodways maintain adequate carrying capacity. Perhaps most important is this clause: “When a
regulatory floodway has not been designated, the floodplain administrator must require that no
new construction, substantial improvements, or other development (including fill) shall be
permitted within Zones A1-30 and AE on the FIRM, unless it is demonstrated that the
cumulative effect of the proposed development, when combined with all other existing and
anticipated development, will not increase the water surface elevation of the base flood more
than one foot at any point within the City of Central.”214 However, it contains no discussion of a
method for determining a metric for cumulative development. This leaves the meaning of
“cumulative effect” vague, in addition to a one-foot limit being a highly lenient standard.
Combined with other problems that can arise from existing development, cumulative effect may
not be a good indicator of overall vulnerability to flood hazard. A proposed development by
itself may cause great harm to the surrounding area; a single development may cause excessive
runoff, compounding drainage problems for surrounding neighborhoods if other flood hazard
mitigation measures are nonexistent. It is not ideal to leave this judgement up to interpretation. A
better method may be to implement a rating system, where definitions on what factors should be
considered in relation to cumulative development. Doing so would emulate safe development
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incentives such as the CRS method that the NFIP employs. Furthermore, interviews with city
officials, made it clear that the city acted without a floodplain manager until mere months before
the 2016 floods struck.215 Many of the duties that the floodplain manager would have performed
were carried out by several people from the Department of Public Works.216 While this was not
negligence since city workers were performing the job, it was not ideal to have several people
acting in a major decision-making role with no guarantee of consistency and continuity.
Floodplain managers have a responsibility to uphold safe development practices in their regions.
In addition to floodplain management issues, problems centering on residences in
subdivisions are obvious. For instance, Ordinance #2012-04 addresses manufactured homes. It
clearly restricts all use of landfill material for elevating sites where residents place manufactured
homes. This restriction is a major issue since manufactured homes are inherently more
vulnerable to issues flood due to their insecure foundations. Housing developments surrounding
them may be built on filled land, causing a fishbowl effect for the areas with manufactured
homes.217 Concerns about standardized fill heights have been a hot-button topic in neighboring
Ascension Parish, which also suffered heavy damage in 2016. Fill regulations in Ascension were
lacking in 2016, with home owners being able to bring in fill to varying levels and heights. Any
homes built below the highest homes would be subject to displacement of floodwaters. Recently,
the Ascension Parish Council passed an amendment that limits fill to 3 feet.218 This step carried
out by the Ascension Parish Council means that builders in the parts of the parish that are most at
risk from flooding may not be able to use dirt fill exclusively. Instead, they would need to use a
combination of dirt and pier-and-beam or chain-wall construction to meet federally designate
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elevation rules in Ascension. This is an excellent example of new safe development policies
being effectively put into place. The fill regulations take community well-being and development
into account, enabling developers to build but also ensuring sound floodplain management. The
new rules will also require the owners of neighborhood and commercial detention ponds to
submit to five-year inspections and carry out necessary maintenance or face potential fines.219 It
is typical for parishes across Louisiana to assign the responsibility for detention ponds to
homeowners’ associations.220 When driving around Central, casual observation shows that
several houses and even neighboring subdivisions exist at different levels of elevation due to fill.
Certain neighborhoods are clearly much more vulnerable to flood risk than others.
Manufactured homes also caused drama in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 flood
events. The Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances requires that homeowners obtain a permit in order
to place manufactured homes on their front property.221 After the 2016 flood, the parish waived
this requirement and allowed residents to place “FEMA trailers” on their front lawns.222 These
trailers act as temporary shelter and facilitate speedy return of residents as they repair their
permanent dwellings. This seems like a viable solution in theory to those affected, but getting
this method right has proven difficult. Waiving the permit requirement allowed people to stay on
their property in the FEMA trailers and rebuild quickly. This left people in bare bones homes
which may not have been fully move-in ready.223 It also prevented people from taking the extra
time to complete additional mitigation steps to prevent their homes from flooding again, such as
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elevating their homes.224 Rather, residents built back up as quickly as possible to restore their
normal routines. This was the case for several of the people I interviewed, with many of them
lamenting that they wish they had had the luxury of extra time to restore their homes fully before
moving back in. In many cases, families sought to spend as little time as possible in a cramped
trailer and desired to get their children back to a normal routine which won out over a desire for
more sustainable renovations.225 While these policies by FEMA and the parish did not mandate
rebuilding quickly, it certainly encouraged it, feeding into the government’s desire for faster
economic recovery from the ordeal.
The problems associated with the FEMA trailers and the handling of disaster relief is of
utmost importance to Central’s preparation for future floods. Because of its small size, Central is
not able to fully separate short-term flood response duties from the task of developing a longterm plan for rebuilding a more disaster-resistant community. Due to small staffs and the
necessity for staff members to wear many hats, the same people are usually involved in both
immediate disaster relief and long-term planning simultaneously.226 Yet preparing managers and
ensuring adequate training for their full range of responsibilities is a challenge. The small town
of Arnold, Missouri, which faced similar development and hazard problems as it expanded out
from the fringes of St. Louis offers a useful analog for successful training.227 It is not uncommon,
especially in newly developing areas of the metropolitan fringe, for cities to be faced with
problems that pre-existed zoning or floodplain management regulations, or with problems
connected to development that occurred under less rigorous measures than current policies. As a
result, it may be impossible to find enough money for elevation, acquisition, demolition, or flood
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proofing of all structures that need attention, even within the minimum standards of current
regulations.228 The role of planning should prioritize spending towards safety and target those
properties that are most vulnerable and / or most likely to suffer additional damage in the case of
a major flood.
A common action taken following flood events is for local governments to buy severely
or repeat damaged property. Simply acquiring flood-damaged properties after a disaster is not
enough to preclude a recurrence of the same problem. Further steps may be taken to ensure that
vulnerable riverfront land is no longer available for development, in accordance with safe
development practices that call for the preservation of greenspace as a potential flood hazard
mitigation method. Central, and Louisiana as a whole, benefit from the existence of ample
wetlands. Wetlands are commonly accepted by city officials and scientists to be a blessing for
flood hazard reduction and one way to protect vulnerable communities is to restore land back to
wetlands.229 Buyouts can aid in this process, something that the state is already pursuing along
the coast through its Louisiana Coastal Master Plan.230 In addition, in October of 2019 Gonzalez,
Louisiana was the topic of news headlines when the Parish purchased residential properties along
an entire street, and Ascension Parish pledged to restore the land back to its pre-1980s wetland
state.231 Proposed in 2017, every resident on the street had to agree to the buyout. The last
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resident consented to the plan in October 2019, and plans will now move forward to clear and
convert the land.232 Central might consider a comparable approach to high risk areas.
Buyouts may seem like a good solution, but they also pose a host of problems. One, they
most certainly fall into the category of actions that toe the line between safe and economic
development, in that they seem to promote safe development but lead to potentially problematic
economic consequences. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) published a report in
2019 that addresses one of the most common problems; time it takes for the buyout to reach
completion. The NRDC reviewed nearly 30 years of FEMA data on buyout funding and found
that it takes a median of more than 5 years between a flood and the completion of a FEMA
funded buyout project.233 Once a property puts in a request for FEMA funding, the homeowner
has no idea how long they will be in limbo. During that time, what happens if improvements
need to be made to the house? If a major appliance must be replaced or even if another flood
occurs? FEMA buyouts are based on pre-flood home value so will not reimburse expenses
incurred in the interim between flood and purchase.234 If they do flood again and the home is
covered by the NFIP, the federal program will pay to rebuild it yet again, simply perpetuating a
cycle of flooding. The FEMA buyout process must be streamlined to be a viable option for most
communities. While the Silverleaf Street scenario is promising, it is not the norm, and it may
take East Baton Rouge Parish and Central quite some time to implement a similar plan.
Drainage is also a major problem in Central that is not adequately addressed in its code of
ordinances. Upon interviewing inhabitants of Central, it became clear that drainage was the most
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important issue to the overwhelming majority of residents as well. Despite many advocates for
restricting flood zone development since 1983, residents still insisted that improved drainage
could fix the city’s flood problems.235 The biggest issue when it comes to drainage in Central is
the confusion over who is responsible to clean certain drainage canals. Some ditches lie in areas
cleaned by the city, while others fall under parish purview, while some exist on private property
under the homeowners’ responsibility. The lack of consistent drainage management lead to
clogged up waterways and to the issues of backwater flooding that played a large role in the
2016 flood event. Interviews clearly revealed that most homeowners faulted the city for not
cleaning ditches and drainage channels prior to the storm in 2016. Several of the interviews took
place after Hurricane Barry threatened the area in July 2019. While the effects of Barry were far
less damaging than initially projected to, it served as a good indicator of lessons learned and new
techniques applied. I will delve further into these ideas in the next chapter, but residents
expressed firm beliefs that it was solely the responsibility of the city to better protect residents
from the effects of storm damage. A former city councilman commented that the city had done a
better job of going out and preemptively cleaning out debris from drainage channels at the first
sign of projected excessive rain, suggesting that the city ‘s response to hazard threats had
improved.236
Section 8.1 of the Central Code of Ordinances gives background on development and
physical geography principles being incorporated into the long-term planning for drainage and
stormwater management. It gives guidelines on what physical properties should be taken into
consideration, such as the importance of an understanding of the local hydrology, topography,
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and soils. The policy guidelines stipulate that it is important to identify the high points and ridges
as well as the low points and swales or channels in addition to which directions the water will
flow in all areas of the site. It calls for mapping floodplains, areas susceptible to flooding and
minimizing development in those areas where possible. Higher areas on the site are the prime
development zones. Concentrating development in higher zones and leaving the lowest areas as
conservation and for stormwater management save construction costs and long term
maintenance.237 Officials should test soil samples from the areas suitable for development, not
just for structural purposes, but for infiltration rates and plant media quality. Much of EBR
Parish has silty clay soils characterized by very low infiltration rates.238 In other words, these
soils hold the water for long periods of time before they are able to reach groundwater. Some
parts of the parish have more permeable soils. The types of soils and their depths can provide
useful information in selecting and designing potential developments and their locations. These
points are touched upon in this section, but there are no accompanying enforcement provisions.
These ideas are key to safe development schemes and their very inclusion in the ordinances show
that the city is capable of thinking in long-term scales, just unable to fully implement these ideas.
Impervious surfaces such as pavement and rooftops generate nine times more runoff than
a woodland area of the same size. Policymakers can diminish runoff by passing local laws that
require new developments to prioritize use of pervious pavement and other surfaces. While
currently no example of this type of policy exists in Central, other areas in East Baton Rouge
Parish such as the parking area of the relatively new White Star Market in mid-city exhibit some
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of these practices adopted by developers without local requirements.239 The 26,000-square-foot
development features TrueGrid permeable paving as the parking surface. TrueGrid permeable
paving — when properly installed — is laid atop a bed of packed stone, leveled, and then filled
with smaller crushed rock and stone to provide an attractive and permeable surface. In essence, a
TrueGrid parking lot serves as an on-site stormwater detention system meaning that Square 46
will actually hold water on site, which will then slowly dissipate rather than runoff into the Baton
Rouge stormwater drainage system, as happens with traditional paved parking surfaces. Change
begins in small scale projects such as this; Hoffpauir Studios, the designers of this project, are
based in EBR parish. Central is an incredibly community centric place; projects like this, thought
up and executed locally are solutions that are entirely possible. Again, over 70 percent of the city
of Central exists in the 100-year floodplain, including commercial development. It is not just
homes that can be better equipped with ways to be more resilient to floods, but businesses and
commercial development as well. With the support of local policy makers through incentives,
similar projects are possible in the city of Central.
4.3. Comparing Policy Choices across Neighboring Parishes
There are several instances in recent political history where EBR’s neighboring parishes
have enacted more impactful change that follow safe development practices than EBR, and by
extension, Central itself. East Baton Rouge Parish is the most populous in the state, with just shy
of 450,000 residents.240 Ascension and Livingston tally 120,000 and 138,000 residents
respectively.241 It is no surprise that economic development lies at the forefront of policy
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decisions. Additionally, Ascension and Livingston have much smaller parish councils and
professional staffs than East Baton Rouge. Aside from these demographic differences, several
factors bring Ascension and Livingston parishes together and make EBR Parish stand out;
population size, socioeconomic status of residents, and civic engagement proclivity.
East Baton Rouge is nearly double the size of Ascension and Livingston parishes
combined. Similarly, they are both much less densely populated, creating a divide in the type of
flood hazard issues that they face, when compared to East Baton Rouge. Topographic maps of
the region show that there is more open space in the two surrounding parishes, while East Baton
Rouge benefits slightly from being on higher ground.242 Population and density have huge
impacts on potential flood hazards. Communities, whether at the level of countries, cities,
parishes or counties, have learnt to cope with flood risks in several ways, the most prominent
ways being engineering solutions and adaptive measures. From a more sustainable point of view,
it can be argued that societies should avoid or at least minimize urban developments in
floodplain areas.243 While many scientists have studied the impact of human activities on flood
risk, policies can integrate the lessons learned from past flood impacts onto future floodplain
development. This is where Ascension, Livingston, and East Baton Rouge parishes differ. East
Baton Rouge Parish has grown significantly since the last round of large floods in 1983; the
development into Central is a stark example of this. Reducing the properties at risk by
encouraging settlement away from high-risk areas or by limiting additional human settlements in
flood-prone areas is a difficult demographic problem. Many studies have shown that the
urbanization of flood-prone areas continues, and puts more and more people, and property, at
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risk of flooding.244 EBR Parish officials have not heeded this concern in the past and show little
sign of heeding it in the future.245 While Ascension and Livingston parishes have also
experienced growth, they have not experienced the same level of explosive growth as East Baton
Rouge Parish in terms of dense floodplain development (though their overall populations have
grown more than that of East Baton Rouge Parish).246 This is also a reason that it has been easier
for Livingston and Ascension parishes to pass policies that can prioritize safe development over
economic development. Conversely, while they do have more space to grow, (with less safe
space in Ascension compared to Livingston Parish), it does not necessarily imply that they are
less intent on bringing in new development. Even small demographic differences, like population
size can have a huge effect on a parish’s ability to implement long term change. Additionally
Denham Springs, Central’s neighbor the east, had a much more robust staff and flood recovery
infrastructure in place. They had a floodplain administrator who had been appointed in 2008247 in
addition to a detailed catastrophic flood response plan.248 While Central prides itself on its small
government, the more centralized form of government in Denham Springs has allowed it to
develop a more effective form of floodplain management best practices.
Civic engagement is of utmost importance to building resilient communities and passing
effective local laws. Community based, participatory research creates bridges among scientists,
lawmakers, and communities, through the use of shared knowledge and valuable experiences.
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Ascension and Livingston parishes have made several amendments to their city ordinances since
the floods of the early 2000s and have taken steps to prioritize safety in the aftermath of the 2016
floods as well. Notably, both amended their policies on standards for areas of shallow flooding to
require new construction to occur at least 2 feet above the BFE and required construction within
zones AH or AO to install adequate drainage paths around structures on slopes, to guide
floodwaters around and away from lower or proposed structures.249 Livingston Parish enacted a
procedure for determining areas of special flood hazard in 2012. The parish uses areas of special
flood hazard identified by FEMA in its 2012 report and in the region’s FIRM issued on April 3,
2012.250 Why are Ascension and Livingston able to get policies amended while East Baton
Rouge has struggled? I suggest that it comes from different levels of civic engagement in local
politics. As seen in the case studies addressed earlier, one of the major factors that has to exist
for community-driven change is an effective advocate, whether that be in one individual or
several organizations that come together to inspire individuals.251 This was easier to accomplish
in the significantly lighter populated Ascension and Livingston Parishes. This is not to say that
there is no community activism in Baton Rouge, but that it is prioritized differently.
Organizations like Together Baton Rouge do important work but they address all kinds of
different problems, from Medicaid to criminal justice reform to food insecurity. They were able
to be good advocates in the immediate aftermath of the flood, but also had to remain focused on
other problems as they arose.252 Other organizations that focus on environmental issues like the
Sierra Club have also made efforts to affect flood mitigation, but I would say that such single
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issue focused groups may not have large success in a parish like East Baton Rouge.253 People in
places like Central rally around community, around family. They are proud of their place in the
parish as residents of Central, separate from the city of Baton Rouge and it is around that identity
that change needs to happen. I believe that more directed community activism is why Central,
when viewed as a singular entity rather than as a part of East Baton Rouge Parish, has seen
successful local efforts. In the elections that followed the August 2016 floods, voters decided to
replace the sitting mayor and the entire city council. The turnout of voters was remarkable and
they were clearly sending a message. This was additionally interesting in that most residents that
I interviewed stated that they supported the city council and the mayor during the flood event,
especially when compared to the lack of immediate help sent by FEMA and the federal
government. It was the aftermath and recovery that most individuals took fault with, including
the proposed plan to construct new subdivisions. Many residents do not support increased
development and feel they have a greater understanding of how floodplains function following
the 2016 floods.254 This involvement of residents of Central in the local election is possible in a
small community; it is much harder to rally all of East Baton Rouge Parish, or even all of Baton
Rouge to come together in issues such as this.
There are many differences among Ascension, East Baton Rouge and Livingston parishes
and many reasons why policy change has come together so differently for them. It is of great
importance to integrate economic, political, environmental, and social specifics in communitybased design and implementation policy change. These are all critical steps to achieve
sustainable safe development. This implies the need for critical analysis of community contexts
to recognize elements that have the potential to limit success and sustainability so that they can
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be dealt with preemptively.255 It is also important to recognize the resilience of, and more
specifically the innovative nature of, local communities and to integrate as well as complement
these bottom-up initiatives. The uniqueness of each community is important and has a direct
effect on how change will best be implemented, especially change that is meant to endure. East
Baton Rouge Parish could learn from the policies and amendments passed by its neighbors and
would further benefit from collaborating directly with them. Even more useful would be the
introduction of a basin wide approach to floodplain management instead of this piecemeal effort
that we currently see in the greater Baton Rouge area, especially following the devastation of the
2016 floods. Several solutions are already widely discussed in the area, such as the
controversially stalled Comite River Diversion Canal and the ill-fated Darlington Reservoir.
Even more useful is the creation of the Amite River Basin Commission, though this would
arguably be more of a blessing if the Commission was given regulatory authority at the basin
scale. The other tool that separates East Baton Rouge Parish from its neighbors is the Stormwater
Master Plan, published in 2018. The plan aims to understand how the parish’s natural and
human-made stormwater systems perform, develop a plan that addresses the risks and impacts of
local and regional flooding, and communicate the plan and engage the public.256 In its
identification of problem areas in the parish, it highlights the City of Central between Hooper
Road and Beaver Bayou to be one of the most pressing areas of concern and addresses the
problems that arise from regional versus local flooding classifications. This document is the only
document that addresses potential possibilities for climate change adaptation locally and can be
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used to jumpstart better basin wide efforts.257 East Baton Rouge Parish may have a professional
leg up on the smaller Ascension and Livingston parishes, but there is no reason they cannot use
the Stormwater Master Plan as something to strive for. Organizations and projects such as these
would elevate the Amite Basin region to new levels of successful floodplain management that
could set an example for the state as a whole. These ideas and other ways forward will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. MOVING FORWARD: CURRENT STATE OF ISSUES IN LOUISIANA
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT

It can be said that much of the damage that resulted from the 2016 floods resulted from a
lack of proper preparation at all levels of government and among stakeholders. The situation at
the time reflected the need for a massive overhaul of the National Flood Insurance Program,
federal flood relief efforts and programs at the state level.258 Some headway has been made since
2016 at the state and local level with East Baton Rouge Parish’s draft Stormwater Masterplan
Implementation Framework.259 Louisiana has extensive areas with a high risk for flood damages,
especially in preparing for incidents of inland flooding. It is important to acknowledge the
impact development has on the coast and on how practices at the coast affect more inland
communities – especially as we see people migrate away from the coast and coastal influences.
People fleeing the coast for what they think are safer inland communities, leads to skyrocketing
development along areas vulnerable to riverine flooding. I have discussed how safe development
and economic development have interacted and affected each other in the past, but what about
looking forward to the future? There are several mechanisms that exist in Louisiana to promote
safe development practices as the population of the greater Baton Rouge area, especially in
Central, continues to grow. The National Flood Insurance Program has room for improvement
and the Louisiana Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast is a game changer on the
state level for project ideas that address flooding. In addition, the city of Central has begun to
take the first steps towards a safer flood management system. Perhaps by better taking in to
account the subtleties that effect safe and economic development can influence policymakers in
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Central in a more positive way. While flood damage can be difficult to predict, there are concrete
ways to move forward to better prepare for future flood hazards
5.1. The National Flood Insurance Program: What is Happening Now?
As mentioned in prior chapters, the National Flood Insurance Program emerged in the
aftermath of Hurricane Betsy, which struck in 1965. Congress passed the National Flood
Insurance Act in 1968, and it gave rise to the National Flood Insurance Program. Almost 40
years later in August 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans just two weeks before the fortieth
anniversary of Hurricane Betsy. On one hand, it appeared that the public flood insurance
program was doing its job: by May 2006, 162,000 Gulf Coast claims had been paid – over 95
percent of the claims which had been received by the federal government and the most claims the
program had ever received.260 Furthermore, by August of 2006 a majority of the claims had been
settled, paying out almost $16 billion in claims (this is not to say that it was by any means
“easy.” Public programs, like the Road Home program were mired in delays and complications
for long periods of time).261 However, because the National Flood Insurance Program was
already running at a deficit, and several other floods and hurricanes struck that year, the program
had to borrow almost $18.6 billion from the United States Treasury. Both policymakers and
those affected blamed the government for neglecting to charge adequate rates to account for the
true cost of losses.262 This makes the issue on whether the program was charging adequate
premiums and how it spent those premiums seem especially relevant because of the increasing
concentration of population and assets in flood hazard areas, along with the possible changes in
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climate patterns that could increase the number and/or severity of floods in the future.263 It is
clear that Hurricane Katrina exposed already glaring cracks in the system and catapulted them to
the forefront of public discussions. In addition, claims that address instances of repeat flooding
continue to cause the program much strife.264
At the time of its inception, the NFIP’s coverage was available to buyers through
specialized insurance agents; the Write-Your-Own-Program supplemented this starting in
1983.265 This program allows insurance companies to write and service the NFIP in their own
names, absolving the companies of any of the risk. Today, the WYP issues almost all NFIP
policies, with private insurance companies processing, paying, defending, and settling all claims,
while the NFIP retains the responsibility to underwrite these losses.266 The WYO program’s
intent is to be a win-win for the NFIP and private insurers since the program benefits from the
insurance industry’s marketing channels and its automatic presence in flood-prone areas, while
the WYO insurance providers do not shoulder any of the financial risk or burdens that come with
such a program. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report in 2010
assessing the long-term impacts of the WYO program, specifically addressing methods FEMA
uses to determine the rates at which WYO’s receive payment, its bonus system’s adherence to
financial control requirements and proposed alternatives to the current system.267 Three
alternative administrative structures could replace the NFIP’s payment arrangement that could
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lower costs for administering claims and selling and servicing flood insurance policies. These
include contracting with a single vendor, contracting with one or more insurance companies or
contracting with multiple vendors and thus maintaining the WYO network. Several advantages
and disadvantages exist in terms of the potential impact on the basic operations of administering
flood insurance policies and adjusting claims, as well as on FEMA’s control of the program and
its contractors. For example, contracting with a single vendor, as FEMA does under the current
NFIP direct program, might be less expensive, but would almost completely remove insurance
companies’ participation and their network of agents. Further, competitive bidding, which would
arise from contracting with one or more insurance companies might lower FEMA’s costs for the
program, but most insurance company officials at the time of the program’s inception said that
they did not want to be federal contractors because of the regulations that would apply and
emphasized that they had agreed to participate in the WYO program only because of its lack of a
federal contract. Conversely, contracting with multiple vendors to service flood policies would
allow FEMA to keep the WYO network and might make oversight more effective because
FEMA would have a contractual relationship with significantly fewer companies. However, this
structure risks encroaching on WYOs’ ability to use a subcontractor to administer their flood
policies.268 Amending how the WYO program is set up could be a way for the NFIP to move
forward.
Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 soon after GAO released this report. At
the time, the newly passed act represented the solution to many of the NFIP’s woes. It raised
insurance premiums to reflect the true cost of flooding. Removing discounts to many policies
which being sold below actuarial risk targets and eliminating grandfathering of older rates were
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among the changes.269 While this helped promote safe development practices by more accurately
representing risk in the floodplain, it prompted a massive public outcry – led by developer
interests in Louisiana. Congress quickly followed the public push back and passed the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which changed the process to alter
subsidized premiums and reinstated grandfathering of lower rates, delaying the increases in
premiums that had been proposed under the Biggert-Waters Act (it also called for further studies
to be carried out). Moving closer to the present, at the time that Hurricane Harvey struck Texas,
the NFIP was $24.6 billion in debt, and the Congressional Budget Office maintains that even
without including the Hurricane Harvey relief, the program still possessed an annual budget
shortfall of about $1.4 billion.270 In its 2017 report, the Government Accountability Office
references the impact of the 2016 flood events in Louisiana, explaining that “FEMA, which
administers the NFIP, owed $24.6 billion as of March 2017 to the Department of Treasury for
money borrowed to pay claims and other expenses, including $1.6 billion borrowed following a
series of floods in [Louisiana] in 2016.”271 Eliminating the debt could reduce the need to raise
rates to pay interest and principal on existing debt. However, additional premiums still will be
necessary to reduce the likelihood of long-term borrowing down the road. Affordability issues
could stem from an increase in premium rates for some property owners and discourage them
from purchasing flood insurance leading to other potential actions to help mitigate these
challenges. It would also make selling properties in high-risk areas next to impossible, ensuring
safer development. In addition, it does not stop economic development and would still encourage
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development into floodplains, rather than promote safer development practices. In Louisiana as a
whole, a pressing issue centers on a shift on the coast from residential to expensive, self-insured
camps of sportsmen.
While much of the buildup of the NFIP debts came from the onslaught of natural hazard
events that have plagued the eastern seaboard and Gulf of Mexico in recent years, the NFIP’s
ongoing shortfalls and inability to become solvent can be attributed to premiums that are not
actuarially sound, lack property owner participations, and the continuation of federal subsidies
that attempt to balance affordability with program stability.272 While the Congressional Budget
Office pins the shortfalls on FEMA’s underestimation of expected claims and the cost of
charging discount rates for certain policies, the previous discussion in this thesis demonstrates
how a lack of adherence to safe development policies also contributes to some of the program’s
failures. As seen in the greater Baton Rouge area, development has been growing in high-risk
areas, despite the knowledge of potential destruction that may result from this process. Some of
the most recent policies passed in East Baton Rouge Parish and the surrounding parishes
demonstrate that it is possible to reconcile safe and economic development at the local level
(such as the buyout of Silverleaf Street in Gonzalez), so the NFIP can and should attempt to
follow that lead. In addition, the 2019 GAO report shows that areas most directly affected by
flood hazards have a fair number of repetitive loss properties present.273 According to a 2018
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report from the American Action Forum, there is a way forward to make amendments to the
program to help ensure it is stable to provide useful assistance for future disaster relief.274
One potential way forward is to expand the size of the coverage pool of those seeking
flood insurance. As of 2007, only about 53 percent of properties that fell within Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHA) actually were insured. Many of these were those that required insurance
with their mortgages.275 The large number of uninsured properties means an increased need for
direct aid from FEMA in the wake of a hazard event; to reduce this it is necessary to convince
those who self-insure or avoid paying back loans to purchase insurance. However, from the view
of the insurance industry, the fewer properties that have flood insurance means the less revenue
each month to cover the costs of claims payouts. To remedy this shortfall will require increasing
the number of NFIP policyholders, not only to raise the level of compliance among property
owners situated in SFHAs, but to raise the amount of premium revenue coming into the program.
This would boost safe development practices, because even though people remain in the
floodplain, giving them better access to insurance would increase their resilience and reduce the
trauma of recovery. The NFIP’s debt to taxpayers could be reduced by driving growth in sectors
like the mortgage industry that falls short of compliance requirements. This will not only help
spread risk among more stakeholders, but will also increase program income. However, the issue
of what constitutes the floodplain still persists. The NFIP determines SFHA’s by using the so
called 100-year floodplain. This concept causes confusion because the general population often
misinterprets it to mean that a flood will inundate the area once in one hundred years, when it is
really an indication probability not frequency. This misunderstanding encourages home buyers to
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invest in risky areas. The relatively short record of flooding and the increasing frequency of
devastating floods due to climate change undermines the reliability of existing FIRMS. To
accommodate the well-known inadequacies of mapping risks, adopting the 500-year floodplain
as the SPHA would greatly expand the risk pool and enable reduced premiums with more people
enrolled.
Another option would be to revise rates to accurately reflect risk. There have been several
attempts to do so thus far (i.e. Biggert-Waters Act, Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability)
that have not been successful. A 2018 study found that premium rates rely on inaccurate data,
making it impossible to calculate accurate premiums. Inaccuracies stem from the fact that flood
risk data is often outdated by the time it is published.276 To bridge this gap it is important to
understand the difficulties in calculating accurate premiums. Unlike other forms of insurance,
like property or health insurance, policy holders usually submit claims in large batches, straining
reserves. Since losses are low in some years but extremely high in others, it is difficult to predict
payments year to year. Further confounding matters is the program’s subsidies for low-income
areas. Congress has set ceilings on premium increases to make flood insurance affordable for all
at-risk properties, but the caps are too low to keep the program afloat.277 Also present are fullrisk premiums, which means that they should cover the cost of any given flood event. 278 Instead,
these premiums only account for the amount of a loss relative to the historical average loss per
year. This does not take into account years with uncharacteristic, catastrophic losses, such as the
2016 Louisiana floods. To help rectify this deficiency, the NFIP should update its FIRMs to
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more accurately inform buyers and builders of the risk to their property and base its pricing
accordingly. Safe development practices would include accurate FIRMS and premiums to ensure
people are aware of the risks they face. Furthermore, phasing out the outdated grandfathered
premium rates that came from previous politically charged flood risk zone reclassifications
would restore accuracy to premium rates. The program might hold existing policyholders to
increases, but with reasonable and affordable caps.
A 2017 study asserts that sharing some of the risks with the private insurance market
would offer a viable adjustment to current procedures – similar to how the WYO program could
be amended.279 Increased participation of private flood insurers could reduce the NFIP’s
exposure to flood risk. The NFIP’s exposure to risk would decline and it would also allow
FEMA to focus on emergency relief work and flood risk mitigation while letting the market
focus on underwriting flood insurance policies. The development of a fully privatized flood
insurance market highly unlikely on account of the volatile nature of flood risk. However, there
are options that would allow for efficient risk sharing. For example, there might be a
combination of feasible options in which private insurers either provide primary coverage to a
majority of policyholders, or they acquire the transferred risk from the NFIP by way of
reinsurance, or private insurers and the NFIP jointly underwrite primary flood risk and pool any
reinsurance. In any of those cases, the NFIP could act as a reinsurer of last resort or could
provide primary insurance that is focused solely on residual market risks left over from what
private flood insurers could not or would not underwrite. This would prevent too many private
companies from getting involved, making where and when FEMA should step in much clearer.
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Lastly, the NFIP would benefit greatly if it updated its program technology. It is currently
relies on technology and processes dating back to the 1960s when the program began.280 For
example, no fully accessible central database of the flood elevation data exists, meaning
homebuyers in SFHAs are required to purchase a new elevation certification that must be
completed by a surveyor each time a property is bought and sold.281 Many of the costs that may
prevent people from buying into the NFIP have the potential of being reduced by simply creating
a central repository for flood zone data or allowing homebuyers to rely on GPS data instead of
requiring a physical surveyor (which could put undue costs on the potential homebuyer). In
addition, the NFIP should introduce a secure platform for processing claims, business analytics,
and customer care. Private insurers already have these real-time systems that are faster and more
accurate than those used by the NFIP and FEMA which often provide data and reports that are
dated by several months, not uncommon for many federal programs. FEMA and the NFIP could
help lead the way to better policies that do a better job of promoting safe development practices.
5.2. Local and State Level Management
When it comes to floodplain management in Louisiana, the crowning jewel of the state
plan is the Louisiana Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast (Master Plan). This
document has been published every five years since 2007 and outlines responses to the loss of
coastal land and threats from storm surge events (though it does not directly address inland
riparian flooding). Because funding is not yet secured for all proposed projects, the Master Plan
identifies a long-term program of construction, operations, and maintenance guided by a
dynamic planning process. This is a concrete way for the state of Louisiana to adhere to safe
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development policies, since the plans incorporate many of the traits outlined in Table, 1.1. One
of the principal objectives of the Master Plan is flood protection in coastal areas, with the goal to
reduce economic losses from floodwaters as a primary concern.282 One of its weaknesses,
however, is that it does not apply to coastal areas or territory that likely will become coastal or
address relocation as an option. Its core objective is a good way to reconcile the sometimes
conflicting concepts of economic and safe development. Safe development does not necessarily
mean that no development can take place in a floodplain; it simply means that any development
should not put populations at undue risk to flood hazards. This approach is doable if effective
planning takes place at several levels of government and industry, which is what the Master Plan
is trying to accomplish for coastal areas. While the Master Plan focuses on the coast, its concepts
could translate to the issues that Baton Rouge faces inland as well, especially when the effects of
rising sea levels begin to be seen in the lower Amite River basin. Most importantly, the Master
Plan operates at a large geographic scale since it covers the entire coastal region of the state,
transcending any single parish or basin. Of the several implementation methods it considers,
perhaps the most useful for inland settings are the ideals of flood risk outreach and education.
TO promote a more holistic flood risk reduction strategy, the CPRA has prioritized outreach and
education.283 It encourages flood risk awareness and promotes access to resources that can help
communities reduce their flood risk. In addition, CPRA published a pocket guide book entitled,
Pocket Guide to Funding Resources: Reducing Flood Risk for Homeowners + Renters +
Business Owners, which aims to provide residents with up to date information about current
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mitigation programs and connect interested individuals with resources to reduce their flood
risk.284
While the future conditions of coastal and inland Louisiana are highly uncertain due to
the dynamics of riverine and marine processes, storm events, climate change, population growth,
economic activity, and ongoing human dependence on the natural resources in the coastal waters,
managing such a complex system in which the natural and socio-economic systems are highly
integrated can be planned for in the long term. Moreover, planning in advance allows economic
interests to be met without sacrificing safe development principles. To reiterate, development can
occur in floodplain areas, but it must follow safer practices that take actual flood risk into
account. In addition, coastal environments and populations that are adjacent to significant water
sources or natural resource based economies face unique challenges due to the interdependence
and delicate balance of water, land, and economic systems and the future uncertainties associated
with the magnitude and rate of climate change impacts. Again, while the Master Plan addresses
coastal hazards these same issues are at the forefront of communities further up the Mississippi
and Atchafalaya rivers. This relationship will hold especially true if sea-level rise encroaches on
coastal communities, transforming communities that were once inland into coastal settlements.
Adaptive management is a scientific application and encourages the integrated and
flexible approach to land and water management that considers risk and uncertainty.285 It
promotes monitoring management practices and making adjustments as evidence reveals either
strengths or weaknesses of practices, all in pursuit of solutions that are sustainable, even in the
face of changing conditions. Connecting short-term investments with long-term challenges and
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the selection of action pathways that allow for maximum flexibility of future decisions are two of
the key concepts of adaptive management. Adaptive management relies on ongoing monitoring
and adjustments as conditions change due to management practices. This figure from the Master
Plan demonstrates how CPRA plans to go about enacting change that does not have a static goal.
The best way to do this is to build institutional knowledge as science evolves and as communities
learn from past hazards. Adaptive management can formalize communication and institutionalize
continual growth of knowledge as uncertainties become resolved and lessons are learned. This
can be well integrated in safe development practices in Central and should be considered as the
community expands. Better engaging stakeholders is an important step to accomplish safe
development, as community backing of proposed policies is essential to successful
implementation, in addition to being an invaluable part of the research process since they can
provide the best first-hand, on-the-ground knowledge.

Figure 5.1. CPRA’s Adaptive Management Activities. Source: CPRA’s 2017 Master Plan for a
Sustainable Coast
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5.3. Central Three Years Later: Next Steps
Preceding chapters discussed the changes in Central’s city ordinances and how the
surrounding parishes of Ascension and Livingston have implemented safe development changes
in their flood policies through buyouts and fill requirements. It is important now to check in with
where Central stands now. How prepared would the city be to deal with a similar event if it were
to occur in the near future?
While massive change has yet to materialize in Central, small informal steps have been
made. When Hurricane Barry threatened the city in July 2019, the preemptive response was
swift, with city officials, parish officials and private citizens came together to clear drainage
channels and able to take on large volumes of runoff should the need arise. All those interviewed
stated that they had retained flood memories from the events of 2016. People stated that they had
marked where the floodwaters rose in their homes and made sure to prepare storage space above
those lines to ensure that in the case of another inundation, their possessions would not be
damaged.286 At the first sign of a heavy rain people begin to watch the speed of the rising water
and plan for a worst-case scenario. In the aftermath of a disaster it is important to assess a
community’s resilience, its ability to bounce back. In an interview Congressman Garret Graves
emphasized the importance of making communities in East Baton Rouge Parish resilient,
speaking to the importance of maintaining a sense of community in the wake of disaster. He
asserts that it is not possible to expect individuals to choose to stay and rebuild in an area that
cannot adequately respond to disaster. He cites securing $10 million for the completion of the
Comite Diversion Canal Project and the Baton Rouge Area Flood Control project as critical to
helping to increase future resiliency since it would enable people to stay and rebuild in place.
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The state also received $1.2 billion from HUD for implementing flood mitigation measures, such
as stemming development in flood prone areas and for speeding up rebuilding efforts for areas
including Central. These funding streams are a blessing to the state for several reasons. In the
wake of experiencing a disaster, a community has to bounce back even stronger, not just at the
same level as before and these projects help propel greater Baton Rouge and the state as a whole
to undertake projects that can prioritize safe development without sacrificing economic gains.
Another major way to move forward is through basin-wide management. As discussed
previously, basin-wide river management has been fairly successfully achieved in places such as
Tulsa, Oklahoma and Rapid City, South Dakota. Basin wide management efforts in the United
States see their roots in Miami Valley and, later, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
Originally conceptualized as a holistic river basin management effort, Congress authorized the
TVA in 1933. In its early stages it strove to construct dams for power, flood control, and
navigation in addition to providing assistance to farmers to help conserve soils, support farmers’
cooperatives, support safe development of new communities, and foster civic participation in
local issues.287 Its most ardent supporters argued that the basin’s unifying authority provided
major economic benefits to the region; the TVA could coordinate developments upstream and
downstream and prioritize the hiring of professionals who possessed an understanding of how to
make these goals a reality.288 However critics argued that this idealized holistic management did
not occur. It is often said that the TVA advanced national interests at the expense of regional
ones, a result of its status as a federal agency.289 It flooded huge areas of the valley, causing mass
displacement and largely abandoned its regional planning and flood control mission to provide
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electric power, with the agency becoming so fixated on power production that it undertook a
buildup of coal and nuclear power while paying little attention to environmental concerns.290 The
TVA has not been without some lasting benefits when it comes to flood mitigation however.
Today, the TVA employs an impressive system of dams to control flooding along the Tennessee
River watershed, preventing about $260 million in flood damage in the TVA region and along
the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers each year. To date, the operation of this system has prevented
over $5.4 billion in flood losses across the Tennessee Valley, including about $4.9 billion in
damage averted at Chattanooga—the most flood prone city in the Tennessee Valley.291 The
downfall of the TVA as an engine for local change was in its founding; it was a national
machine, created to uphold national interests. For success on the basin scale, efforts must be kick
started at the local level.
The Amite Basin does have the Amite River Basin Commission, with the major
drawback being that the ARBC does not have any basin-wide regulatory authority. The stated
goals of the ARBC are to “mitigate flood damage in the Amite River Basin, with the commission
serving as a multi-parish authority to accomplish flood control measures; facilitate cooperation
among federal, state, and local governing bodies to foster floodplain management; maintain and
operate structures built under the purview of the Commission; and coordinate river management
within the basin.”292 They have put out reports on proposed solutions to flood hazards in the area
such as an overall floodplain management report and a report in the wake of the 2016 flood.293
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Until the ARBC receives regulatory oversight authority, it will not serve as an actual force for
effective change, though it may be able to function partially as an advocacy body.

The recently launched Louisiana Watershed Initiative shows a higher degree of promise
when it comes to enacting tangible change on the front of basin wide river basin management. In
response to the 2016 floods, Gov. John Bel Edwards tasked several state agencies with
coordinating their efforts to develop a new approach to reducing flood risk throughout Louisiana.
The early stages of this included efforts ranging from the development of hydraulic and
hydrologic models to the development of watershed coalitions in coordination with parish, state
and federal entities.294 Over the course of this two-year period, the state and its partners have
made stunning progress and many findings have emerged that are helping to inform the state’s
shift from mitigating flood risk jurisdictionally to one that more directly takes into account the
flow of water and basin wide boundaries. While this is not necessarily a policy-based solution, it
is a way forward that directly marries safe and economic development practices with its focus on
sound engineering techniques and increasing the entire Amite Basin’s resilience to flood hazards.
The Louisiana Watershed Initiative brings together stakeholders at several levels of government,
with participating organizations including the Office of Community Development, the Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority, the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness, the Department of Transportation and Development and the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.295 Other local solutions to basin-wide floodplain
management can be seen in the Coastal Sustainability Studio at LSU. The Studio currently
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oversees the Inland from the Coast Project (IFC), which looks to model present and future
environmental conditions, community well-being research and applied building, community, and
landscape design for ongoing flood recovery and long-term resilience across the greater Baton
Rouge inland-coastal region.296 The project works with the Water Institute and the OCD to
explore local solutions, with efforts underway to consider basin wide approaches. In addition,
community-based participatory efforts are an excellent way to move forward. Many people
interviewed for this project have cited how the floods have given them a renewed sense of civic
duty, in that they feel that they are making a different by attending parish council meetings and
other gatherings that deal with recovery from the floods. Many of them stated that they would
continue to participate and encourage others to join them at city hosted events that were to
discuss development in to the flood zone.297 This multi-scalar approach is a way forward in an
increasingly interdisciplinary field. Collaboration from organizations like the Water Institute, the
OCD, the Coastal Sustainability Studio, the Amite River Basin Commission, and the Louisiana
Watershed Initiative can pair with local knowledge to be able to inject life into safer
development practices with methods that actually suit the specific community and basin in which
they operate.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
The major questions this thesis sought to answer were: (1) Do local and federal
government policies inhibit or enable development into the floodplain? and (2) How have the
policies effecting Central addressed safe versus economic development since the 2016 floods?
Through interviews and an analysis of public policies and ordinances this thesis has shown that
despite policies prioritizing economic development, the two poles of the paradox spectrum can
be reconciled when it comes to the floodplain. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, most of the
policies in East Baton Rouge Parish historically fall on the side of promoting development into
the floodplain rather than slowing it or ensuring safety. However, following the events of 2016
and a more engaged public, there have been steps to move toward a paradigm of safer
development practices. This can be directly seen in more recently passed policies, especially in
Ascension and Livingston parishes, giving hope to the idea that change can come in Baton
Rouge. Through the interviews conducted, it is clear that perceptions around flooding are critical
to forming more sustainable solutions.
Because of the dependence on FEMA flood insurance, I do not expect local
residents to rely strictly on state/local government for flood recovery, but rather they would
assert that floodplain management needs to occur across different levels of government. The
results of this analysis indicate that flood mitigation policy evolved slower than development
into flood-prone areas, allowing an increase in properties at risk over time due to the absence of
publicly driven mitigation strategies. The 2016 flood exposed this situation and prompted the
recent growth in public concern.. The results of my thesis helps reveal in a fine-grained way the
government policy adjustments after major flooding events. By doing so, I hope, it will also
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assist with government efforts, especially in Central, to identify steps to mitigate risk and
exposure
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, much of the literature already published on this topic
focuses on flooding, government policies, and community resilience. The papers and studies
look at how expansion into flood prone areas effect a community’s ability to bounce back from
repeated floods, government policies that that relate to flooding, and how vulnerability effects
different communities. However, there is a lack of literature that addresses the short-term policy
response to disruptive floods. Furthermore there has been little attention directed toward
bridging the gap between the paradoxes of safe and economic development in floodplain
management.
Reflecting on my methodologies, I am confident that utilizing qualitative research
methods was the most effective course of action. The combination of analyzing public policies in
Central, utilizing similar case studies from around the country, and interviewing residents locally
enabled the assembly of a well-rounded account of the current state of floodplain management in
the region. If I had relied solely on policies or case studies I would have missed much of what
makes Central unique and the important role that community activism plays in jumpstarting
policy change, especially at the local level. By simply looking at the speed of development in
East Baton Rouge Parish without having an understanding of the people who choose to make
their homes in these areas and the choices they make that keep them there, even in the face of
disaster, would be an incomplete picture. In addition, it is important to remember that it is not
just new development that needs to be taken into account, but making adjustments for existing
structures and policies to create immediate results in the fight for more effective flood policy. I
have made an effort to chart a path toward making some of these connections – to demonstrate
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the lack in evolution of government policy at the speed of development into flood prone areas
and show that economic well-being does not have to come at the expense of community safety. It
is the government’s role to protect the people it serves, but to do so, it must grow and expand, as
its residents expand into the floodplain.
These conclusions also have implications beyond the scope of this study,
illustrating the importance of community resiliency in the face of natural hazards and humaninduced disasters, especially when it comes to floodplain management. The resilience
demonstrated by the people of Central and the slow change in how governments respond to flood
hazards can serve as an example of how floodplain management must evolve faster to match
development in individual areas. Safe development does not have to come at the expense of
economic gain; the two ideas can and must be reconciled and recent developments in the state
such as the Louisiana Master Plan for A Sustainable Coast, the Louisiana Watershed Initiative,
the Amite River Basin Commission, and even simply advances in community policy are
examples of how times are changing. However, Central’s struggle is not a singular event—it is
an indicator of hazards to come and how policy change has to begin from the bottom up. The
country has watched Louisiana drowned by the very water that sustains it time and time again;
perhaps observers can also look to communities in Louisiana, like Central, as an example of how
to respond to large-scale disruptive events as it continues to recover and grow.
The major goal of this study was for the people of northern Baton Rouge,
especially the community of Central, to have a better grasp on how they can more efficiently
respond to floods. My hope is that the municipal government of Central will take the information
presented here and attempt to apply some of the policy changes recommended before another
flood inevitably barrels through and ravages the area.
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APPENDIX A. INFORMED WRITTEN CONSENT FORM

1. Study Title: Changing Geographies of Flood Mitigation Policies: A Case Study of Central,
Louisiana
2. Through this study the researcher hopes to learn about residents of the town of Central and
their expressions pertaining to the 2016 Baton Rouge floods through first-hand accounts. All
conversations will be kept entirely confidential by the researcher. The interviews will be taperecorded and then transcribed into a secure computer file. Your participation is voluntary and it
is not necessary to answer all the questions. It is the researcher’s hope that the results of this
study will be used to inform better policy decisions in Central. Your time commitment will be
about 1 hour.
3. Risks: There is only minimal risk associated with this study. Transcriptions of interviews will
be kept in the principal investigator’s office and identity will be kept confidential unless
permission is expressly given by participant.
4. Benefits: There will be no monetary benefits but participants will gain an understanding and
appreciation for the flood policy planning process and have a greater sense of involvement in
their community.
5. Alternatives (if applicable): N/A
6. Investigators: You may contact Ria Mukerji or Dr. Craig Colten for questions about this
project. Ms. Mukerji is available from 8:00 AM to 7:00 PM and Dr. Colten is available from
11:00 AM to 2:00 PM, Monday – Friday.
7. Performance Site: Central, Louisiana
8. Number of subjects: 15
9. Subject Inclusion: Any person who resides in Central, Louisiana and has either flooded in the
past or lives in the flood zone is eligible to participate.
10. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any
time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they might otherwise be entitled.
11. Privacy: Results of the study may be published, but no names or identifying information will
be included in the publication unless permission is expressly given. Subject identity will remain
confidential unless disclosure is required by law.
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12. Signatures: The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered.
I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. For injury or
illness, call your physician, or the Student Health Center if you are an LSU student. If I have
questions about subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Dennis Landin, Institutional
Review Board, (225) 578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, or www.lsu.edu/research.
I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the investigator's obligation
to provide me with a signed copy of this consent form.
Subject Signature: _______________________________ Date: ________________

Ria Mukerji: 909-680-9872, rmuker1@lsu.edu, 236 Howe-Russell Geoscience Complex
Dr. Craig Colten: 225-578-4420, ccolten@lsu.edu, 259 Howe-Russell Geoscience Complex
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(C) Copies of all instruments to be used
Interview Topics and Questions
1. Where are you originally from? Did you grow up in Louisiana? Where (which parish)?
2. How long have you lived in Central?
3. Did you flood in 2016?
4. What are your perceptions of flood risk in this area? Do you feel in danger?
5. Did you feel that your local government did enough to help with the recovery process?


If not, what do you think they could have improved upon/how could they have been more
helpful to you specifically?

6. What has been the impact of any government implemented programs in your community, if
any?
7. How have you been involved in the flood recovery process?
8. What aspects of your community do you find so important that you would move away if they
were lost?
9. What about your community makes you feel safe?
10. Do you feel like you have a voice in your local government?
11. How involved are you in your local government?
12. Do you think an event similar to 2016 could occur again in the near future?
13. What is your tipping point? In other words, was the 2016 event, “the last straw?” Would you
leave Central if another similar storm came through?
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